COMMENT

CONFUSING THE MEANS FOR THE ENDS:
HOW A PRO-SETTLEMENT POLICY RISKS
UNDERMINING THE AIMS OF TITLE VII

ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN†
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1362
I. THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF SETTLEMENTS ............................. 1364
A. The Conflict Between Settlements and the Aims of Title VII ............ 1365
B. The Role of the EEOC ............................................................... 1368
II. THE SPLIT ON SUBSTANTIVE LAW ............................................. 1370
A. A Source of Confusion: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ........... 1371
B. Determining the Validity of Different Settlement Methods ................ 1371
1. Fulgence and the Adoption of Federal Law ......................... 1372
2. Morgan and the Use of State Law ...................................... 1374
C. The “Voluntary and Knowing” Requirement .................................. 1375
1. Pierce and the Adoption of Federal Law............................. 1376
2. Makins and the Application of State Law ............................1377
D. The End Result: General Confusion ............................................. 1378
III. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN SETTLEMENT ENFORCEMENT ..... 1379
A. Federal Court Jurisdiction........................................................... 1379
1. Requesting the Federal Court Retain Jurisdiction .............. 1380
2. Establishing Diversity Jurisdiction .....................................1381
3. Establishing Supplemental Jurisdiction ..............................1381
4. General Federal Question Jurisdiction ............................... 1382
B. State Sovereign Immunity........................................................... 1386
† J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Serena Mayeri and Professor Catherine Struve for their help developing this Comment, the
members of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their editing, and my parents for their
continued support.

(1361)

1362

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1361

C. The Counterintuitive Exhaustion Requirement .............................. 1389
IV. USING FEDERAL LAW ................................................................. 1391
A. Impact on the Consequences of Settlements and
Doctrinal Confusion ................................................................... 1392
B. Impact on Jurisdictional Problems ................................................ 1393
C. Impact on States’ Ability to Assert Sovereign Immunity ................... 1395
D. Can Federal Law Be Used? ........................................................ 1400
1. Rules of Decision Act ....................................................... 1400
2. Creation of Federal Law Versus
Absorption of State Law ................................................... 1401
a. The Uniformity Interest ................................................. 1402
b. The Conflict Between State Law and a
Uniquely Federal Interest ............................................... 1403
i. The Uniquely Federal Interest ............................. 1403
ii. The Existence of a Significant Conflict ................. 1405
c. The Effect on Commercial Relationships ........................... 1406
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 1407

INTRODUCTION
When analyzing cases arising from disputes over Title VII1 settlements,
courts often begin with the proposition that Congress intended to encourage voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims.2 As a result,
courts resolve many issues attendant to the settlement process with the aim
of furthering this policy but without proper consideration of the policy’s
effect on the underlying goals of the statute. Although Title VII suits are
not settled significantly more than are other claims,3 approximately seventy
percent of all employment discrimination claims end in settlement,4 creating a potential for the settlement scheme to undermine or, if properly

1
2

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006).
See, e.g., Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981) (“In enacting Title VII,
Congress expressed a strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment
discrimination claims.”); see also United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 85 (2d Cir. 2011).
3 See Stewart J. Schwab & Michael Heise, Splitting Logs: An Empirical Perspective on Employment Discrimination Settlements, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 931, 933 (2011).
4 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare
in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440 (2004). Scholars continue to rely on
this percentage. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 112-13 (2007); Schwab &
Heise, supra note 3, at 932.
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executed, enhance Title VII’s substantive aims.5 In addition, even before
employees bring their claims to court, a significant number of Title VII
complaints lodged with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)6 are resolved through the EEOC’s mandatory “conciliation”
process.7 In this respect, the pro-settlement policy has yielded its intended
result. However, simply counting the number of settlements masks the
more complicated (and meaningful) question of whether the pro-settlement
policy is truly facilitating compliance with the substantive goals of Title VII.8
The frequency of employment discrimination settlements has spawned a
growing and scattered body of case law on the enforcement of settlement
agreements.9 Courts have long split on whether to apply federal or state law
when considering the validity of a settlement,10 but their analyses tend to
address the issue of a settlement’s validity somewhat narrowly. Courts
rarely acknowledge the systemic impact of the push to settle. Similarly,
their analyses frequently fail to take account of the considerable substantive
and procedural obstacles facing employees who seek to enforce or, in some
cases, avoid allegedly invalid settlements.
This Comment attempts to connect these two distinct but related problems—the frequency of settlements on the one hand, and the failure of the
law governing settlements to account for Title VII’s policy aims on the
other—and argues that the adoption of federal common law would provide
a mechanism for mitigating the current flaws in the administration of Title

5
6

Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at 932.
The EEOC is an executive office, headed by five presidential appointees, and is the federal
government’s enforcement unit for Title VII. It receives complaints, investigates allegations,
negotiates between employees and employers, and, when all else fails, brings enforcement actions.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (creating the EEOC and outlining its roles and responsibilities);
About the EEOC: Overview, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 15,
2013) (summarizing the EEOC’s role at various stages of employment discrimination claims).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (outlining the conciliation process).
8 Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing against settlements on the theory that the duty of judges “is not to maximize the ends of private parties . . . but
to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution
and statutes”).
9 See, e.g., Daniel P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray: The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard for
Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 7374, 85-108 (2005) (stating, with respect to the “knowing and voluntary” standard for entering into
a settlement, that “the law governing when a court should enforce a person's purported waiver or
release of claims under Title VII . . . is in disarray” and analyzing the confusion in the case law).
10 Compare Morgan v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 474-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that state law applies), with Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209
(5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that federal law applies).
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VII and connected settlements.11 Part I of this Comment addresses the
scope and impact of Title VII settlements and considers the particularly
troubling proliferation of confidential settlements. Part II reviews the
current split between courts that apply federal law and those that apply
state law as the substantive rules of decision governing settlementenforcement suits. Part III considers the procedural hurdles facing employees who attempt to enforce settlements. The current state of the law creates
a number of difficulties for employees who seek to adjudicate their claims in
federal court, creates unwarranted challenges for state employees, and
imposes an unnecessary administrative exhaustion requirement.
Finally, Part IV argues that the myriad obstacles facing employees suggest that private settlement provides an insufficient remedy and that the
current state of affairs creates a significant conflict with the strong federal
interests that Title VII endeavors to promote. As a result, this Comment
advocates an important but partial solution to this problem—courts should
apply federal rules of decision to suits that attempt to enforce Title VII
settlements. The suggestion to apply federal common law is made with full
awareness of the strong trend against judicial lawmaking in federal courts.
Indeed, the aim of Parts I–III is to convince the reader that it is worth
waging that uphill battle. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that application of federal common law is justifiable, would help ensure access to
federal courts, and would arm those courts with the tools necessary to begin
mitigating the negative consequences of the current systemic push to settle.
I. THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF SETTLEMENTS
The law governing Title VII settlements and the procedural hurdles it
creates for parties to a settlement take on increased importance in light of
the sheer volume of settlement agreements. A 2004 study of employment
discrimination cases filed in federal court from 1979 through 2000 provides
a glimpse of the role settlements play in effectuating Title VII.12 During the
twenty one–year period studied, over 185,000 employment discrimination
cases (approximately seventy percent of all employment discrimination cases
filed) ended in settlement.13 Many of these settlements took place under
conditions that suggest unequal bargaining power.
11 Although settlements undoubtedly have an impact on the administration and effectiveness
of other employment discrimination statutes, this Comment focuses exclusively on settlements of
Title VII claims.
12 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 432-38.
13 Id. at 440. The data mainly concerned Title VII claims, but § 1981, § 1983, Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and Family and
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A. The Conflict Between Settlements and the Aims of Title VII
Though Congress encourages settlement of employment discrimination
claims, settlements threaten Title VII’s two substantive goals: compensating
victims of employment discrimination and deterring future discrimination
in the workplace.14 The impact of settlements on Title VII’s deterrence aim
is largely a result of contract bargaining dynamics. An employer will offer
only enough money or benefits to coax an employee into settling, and the
employee is under no obligation to negotiate on behalf of other employees.
Hence, the consideration the employee receives—and for which she bargains—is likely to advance the compensation, not the deterrence, goal.15
Moreover, an employer who is willing to pay can essentially “deregulate by
contract,” choosing to continue a potentially unlawful practice in the hope
that other employees are either willing to settle16 or willing to refrain from
raising complaints in the first place.17 Employers successful in carrying out
such a strategy can delay or entirely avoid true Title VII compliance.
The frequency of confidential settlements exacerbates the threat to the
deterrence aim. One federal magistrate judge estimated that eighty-five to
ninety percent of employment discrimination settlements include a confidentiality provision.18 As the EEOC has argued, substantial public settlements at least signal to employers that they are subject to liability if they do
not cease unlawful practices. Even if public settlements are not substantial,
an individual employer still risks embarrassment and unfavorable publicity
should the settlement be disclosed, as a settlement implies that unlawful

Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims were included, as well. Id. at 431. In addition, plaintiffs
proceeded pro se in just under twenty percent of all Title VII cases. Id. at 434 tbl.1. While pro se
litigants did not necessarily occupy the same percentage in original Title VII suits as in settled
claims, this statistic is at least suggestive of the possibility that settlements occur between parties
with uneven bargaining power.
14 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999).
15 See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 490-94 (2001) (arguing that deterrence aims are not
served when employees settle). It is fair to assume, for example, that some plaintiffs given the
choice between personal compensation and workplace-wide management adjustments would
choose the former.
16 Id. at 493 (“Permitting employers to systematically purchase the right to discriminate—or
to be free of the fear of being accused of discriminatory practices—wasn’t part of the plan.”).
17 Id. at 492 (suggesting that “practical” employees may choose not to sue to avoid any stigma
when applying for new jobs).
18 Kotkin, supra note 4, at 113 n.4.
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activity has occurred.19 These public and defendant-specific deterrence
benefits disappear when parties seal the terms of settlement.20
Settlements also undercut the compensatory aim. Confidential agreements make it more difficult for future plaintiffs to negotiate positive
results.21 Without being able to point to previous prevailing plaintiffs, an
employee loses significant leverage when bargaining with her employer.
Similarly, although all jury trials are subject to some uncertainty,22 an
employee reviewing a largely undeveloped case law will find it harder to
assess the degree of risk involved when deciding whether to reject a settlement she views as offering inadequate compensation for her injuries.
Furthermore, the prevalence of secret settlements skews public perception and hampers the ability of legislatures and courts to react to the current
state of Title VII compliance. As one commentator has bluntly stated,
“Because of invisible settlements, no one knows—or has the capacity to
determine—what really is going on with employment discrimination
litigation.”23 Employers are likely to settle meritorious claims, ever cognizant of the cost and time-consuming nature of trials,24 as well as the risk of
facing a jury.25 As a result, the less meritorious claims move forward, and
plaintiffs’ success rate at trial is significantly lower than it would be absent
so many settlements.26 This low success rate creates a perception that Title
19 See EEOC v. Rush Prudential Health Plans, No. 97-3823, 1998 WL 156718, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 31, 1998). Of course, some would argue that these settlements are simply a cost of doing
business and should not be perceived to communicate wrongdoing.
20 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 265859 (1995) (contending that prohibiting secrecy enables settlements “to fulfill at least some of the
public values of adjudication”).
21 See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. R EV. 927, 930
(2006) (“[I]nvisible settlements hamper lawyers’ efforts to evaluate cases, counsel clients, and
negotiate effectively on clients’ behalf.”).
22 See Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 513, 527-28 (2012) (discussing the “inherent unpredictability” of the jury system); cf.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 213 (1994) (“[S]ettlement reflects the uncertainty of
trial . . . .”).
23 Kotkin, supra note 21, at 961.
24 See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075 (stating that the benefit of settlement is the avoidance of the
costs and time of trial); Silverstein, supra note 15, at 492 (noting the preference of employers to
avoid litigation that is “expensive, emotionally draining, and time-consuming—whether or not the
underlying complaint has merit”).
25 Cf. generally Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2094 (1998) (analyzing the unpredictability of punitive
damage awards). But see Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 443 (“In all likelihood juries and
judges [in employment discrimination cases] are acting similarly . . . .”).
26 See Kotkin, supra note 21, at 962 (noting that this phenomenon makes it appear as though
“most employment discrimination plaintiffs have weak cases and lose at trial” because “employers
are quick to settle any case where the plaintiff has a likelihood of success”).
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VII claims are often frivolous.27 Special interest groups advocating against
employment discrimination legislation have used these statistics as ammunition.28 Moreover, some have argued this perception of frivolity can affect
the beliefs of judges presiding over Title VII claims.29
Correcting flaws in employment discrimination legislation also requires
significant political capital, and the suppression of meritorious claims caused
by settlements makes any (already unlikely) legislative adjustments even more
difficult.30 The move toward settlement—especially secret settlements—hides
“real life stories” from the public eye and stifles public awareness of current
issues in employment discrimination.31
The frequency of settlements may also prevent Title VII case law from
developing, thus leaving little precedent to hold employers liable for engaging
in more subtle forms of discrimination.32 This form of discrimination, coined
“second generation employment discrimination,” lacks the “smoking gun”
element of earlier discrimination cases.33 Settlements, which preclude full
development of the facts of a case, may obscure “what employment discrimination looks like in this second generation era” and thereby complicate the
task judges face when identifying discrimination in cases that are not
resolved through settlement.34 Lacking a robust body of precedent, judges
may be more hesitant to conclude that an employer is liable for subtler
forms of discrimination.35

27
28

See id.
See id. at 963 (contending that “conservative interest groups” have “fueled” the perception
that employment discrimination claims are often unmeritorious).
29 See id. at 931-32 & nn.14-16 (declaring that “judicial hostility sometimes can be palpable”
and “[j]udges do not hesitate to suggest that most plaintiffs are whiners”).
30 See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 838 (2011)
(recounting the difficulty Congress faced in passing the 1991 amendments to Title VII in the face
of an initial presidential veto).
31 Hila Shamir, About Not Knowing—Thoughts on Schwab and Heise’s Splitting Logs: An
Empirical Perspective on Employment Discrimination Settlements, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 957,
961 (2011).
32 See id. at 960-61.
33 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459-61 (2001) (proposing a theory of employment discrimination that is
based on “structural, relational, and situational” biases, as opposed to conscious biases).
34 See Shamir, supra note 31, at 960 (exploring the “sociocultural and legal effect[s]” of
increased settlements in an employment discrimination context).
35 See Sturm, supra note 33, at 537-38 (discussing the negative effects of courts’ failure to
scrutinize discretion-based employment practices). But cf. Lemos, supra note 30, at 823 (arguing
that “simply seeing case after case of the same type [may not] give judges the information they
need in order to understand the legal claims involved” when “bias operate[s] wholly subconsciously”).
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Finally, the current literature fails to consider the effects of arbitration
on Title VII in tandem with the information about settlements’ effects.36
Courts of appeals have consistently held that employment contracts can
validly compel arbitration of Title VII claims.37 Because of procedural
hurdles in arbitration, such as the lack of a class action option, employees
may feel even more pressure to settle meritorious claims.38 For those who
do not settle, the results of arbitration frequently remain confidential
nonetheless.39 Both settlements of claims sequestered to arbitration and
claims that are fully arbitrated are left out of the data generally considered
when assessing the impact of settlements. Arbitrations, as is the case with
settlements, likely often miss the opportunity to advance Title VII’s
substantive aims. Instead, the goal is to quickly and confidentially resolve
claims, not to tailor a remedy to Title VII’s policy ends. A more complete
understanding of the data on arbitration would clarify the extent to which
both settlement and arbitration undercut Title VII.40
B. The Role of the EEOC
While the EEOC retains the ability to bring suits on its own,41 complete
reliance on the EEOC is an unrealistic and inadequate cure to the complications
36 The effect of arbitration on Title VII generally has been the subject of scholarly treatment.
See, e.g., Mary Rebecca Tyre, Arbitration: An Employer’s License to Steal Title VII Claims?, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 1359, 1371 (2001) (arguing that federal courts are a more appropriate forum for resolution
of Title VII claims than are private arbitrations). It appears, however, that no study has taken an
empirical approach to the combined effects of arbitration and settlement.
37 See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2003);
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Desiderio v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases upholding mandatory
arbitration agreements).
38 Cf. Steven S. Poindexter, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Title VII:
Promoting Efficiency While Protecting Employee Rights, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 301, 311 (noting that
arbitrations bar class actions and impose “potentially prohibitive costs”); Tyre, supra note 36, at
1363 (listing the deficiencies of private arbitration).
39 See Megan E. Wooster, Note, Sexual Harassment Law—The Jury is Wrong as a Matter of Law,
32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 215, 256 (2010) (noting the confidential nature of arbitration).
40 Such an understanding is beyond the scope of this Comment, however.
41 The EEOC possesses statutory authority to enforce Title VII. To protect the Commission
from private efforts to stifle this power, courts generally invalidate settlements that bar cooperation with the EEOC. See, e.g., EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996)
(“[A] waiver of the right to assist the EEOC offends public policy under . . . Title VII.”); see also
Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L.
REV. 481, 529 nn.189-90 (2008) (collecting cases about settlement practices that are against public
policy); cf. EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[I]f
the EEOC were foreclosed from pursuing investigations whenever the charging party . . . wished
to settle with his or her employer, employers would be able to forestall investigations into their
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that settlements create. First, the EEOC will be unaware of the problems in
cases settled before an employment discrimination charge is filed. Second,
employees who have already been compensated via settlement may be
hesitant to risk further tension with their employers to serve the greater
public good by lobbying the EEOC to seek injunctive relief. As one current
EEOC commissioner has acknowledged, “Title VII’s enforcement mechanisms rely on private attorneys general,” and “[d]efendants and courts . . .
frustrate the need for public resolutions by requiring and supporting
confidential settlements and mandatory arbitration agreements.”42 The
EEOC simply lacks the resources to vindicate Title VII rights without the
help of private plaintiffs.43 Notably, when the agency chooses not to act, the
public remains unaware because EEOC charges “shall not be made public.”44 Taken together, this demonstrates that the EEOC cannot be relied
on to singlehandedly accomplish the goals of Title VII.
*

*

*

In essence, settlements and arbitration—especially when they contain
confidentiality clauses—often hinder the realization of Title VII’s substantive goals. While their full effects remain unknown, it is safe to assume that
some employees are unduly pressured into settling their claims,45 that private,
alternative resolution of claims skews the public’s understanding of the state
employment practices by ‘buying off’ any victim who had the temerity to complain.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
42 Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 36 U.
MEM. L. REV. 25, 30-31 (2005).
43 See id. at 31.
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
45 See, e.g., Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (reinstating the Title VII complaint of an employee who alleged that he was “forced” to sign an earlier
settlement agreement); cf. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272
F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing plaintiff ’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim that her
employer withheld a promotion because she refused to settle an earlier claim); James R. Coben &
Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 91 n.203 (2006) (collecting cases in which plaintiffs alleged undue pressure
to settle). Pressure to settle may also be more systematic. The combination of the EEOC
requiring settlement discussions, courts encouraging settlements, and employees knowing that
they may have to return to the workplace against which their claim is brought creates its own
subtle form of pressure on employees to settle. Cf. Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual
Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 317 (1991) (arguing that
a female Title VII plaintiff may feel pressure to settle a sexual harassment claim to avoid the risk
of embarrassment that would result from trial testimony about her sexual history); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated
Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 918 (positing that an overburdened EEOC will foster an
attitude aimed at settling quickly to dispose of cases).

1370

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1361

of discrimination in the workplace,46 and that the policy of encouraging
settlement works to undermine the goals of deterrence and compensation.
Though courts must consider Congress’s encouragement of settlements,
they need not do so indiscriminately. The serious shortcomings that
settlement’s current dominance creates are not irremediable. Courts should
check for these undesirable consequences, and suits in which a previous settlement is at issue present a means with which to begin tackling the problem.
II. THE SPLIT ON SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Unsurprisingly, due to the large number of settlements, there is a significant number of cases in which enforcement is an issue, and the law that
is applied in enforcing a settlement influences the pro-settlement regime’s
effectiveness in accomplishing the aims of Title VII. Generally, these cases
take two forms: (1) an employer raises an earlier settlement agreement as an
affirmative defense to preclude the employee’s subsequent Title VII suit, or
(2) an employee files suit claiming that the employer breached a settlement
agreement. Collectively, these cases create opportunities for courts to
monitor how Title VII is carried out through settlements, enabling them to
ensure both that employees are not unduly pressured into settling and that
employees actually receive the compensation for which they waived their
claims. However, the law governing settlement agreements is in a state of
confusion, and courts often miss the chance to protect the large number of
employees who, essentially, allege that private settlement was an insufficient
remedy.
The most common issue in Title VII settlement-enforcement suits is
whether the parties initially reached a valid settlement. Obviously, if the
employer and employee failed to reach a binding agreement, the inquiry
ends there.47 To resolve this initial question, some courts apply federal law;
others insist that state law governs what is essentially an issue of contract—
whether there is a binding agreement for which some of the consideration
was waiver or release of a Title VII claim.
This Part recounts the differing views on the proper approach to the
creation of federal rules in settlement-enforcement suits. While some courts
reach the conclusion this Comment supports—that federal law should
apply—their reasoning unduly focuses on choosing rules based on general
contract principles without regard to the effect those rules have on Title
46
47

See supra notes 26-28.
See, e.g., Heuser v. Kephart, 215 F.3d 1186, 1191-93 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a settlement of
a Title VII claim unenforceable for lack of consideration).
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VII’s aims. The current failure to tie these decisions to Title VII has
resulted in conflict among the circuits.
A. A Source of Confusion: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
The Supreme Court briefly touched upon the rules governing Title VII
settlements in one case, but it did so tangentially and in a manner that
generated confusion about the applicability of federal law. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., the Court considered the interplay between arbitration
of claims arising from an employer-employee contract that forbade discrimination and judicial resolution of claims grounded in Title VII.48 The Court
held that Title VII supplements any rights obtained in a contract and that
employees could, therefore, bring Title VII claims in federal or state court
even if they arbitrated the contract claims.49
In so holding, the Court distinguished cases in which an employee settled an alleged violation of Title VII and declared such waivers acceptable if
the employee’s consent was “voluntary and knowing.”50 Some courts have
used this distinction as the starting point for applying federal law to enforcement suits;51 others have been quick to argue that the Supreme Court’s
statement constituted dicta and have applied state law instead.52
B. Determining the Validity of Different Settlement Methods
One recurring issue in Title VII settlement-enforcement suits is the
validity of different means of settling. This Section considers two different
issues: the validity of oral settlements and the issue of apparent authority.
The circuits are split over whether federal law or state law should apply
to these questions.53 I argue that courts should apply federal law and assess
whether a settlement rule is valid based on the consequences it would have
on Title VII’s aims. Unfortunately, courts have instead determined whether
48
49
50
51

415 U.S. 36, 47-54 (1974).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 52 & n.15.
See, e.g., Myricks v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 480 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2007); Melanson v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 2002); Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co.,
884 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1989); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1988).
52 See, e.g., Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Makins v.
District of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2002); cf. Atkinson v. Sellers, 233 F. App’x 268,
273 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying state law without consideration of Alexander); Morgan v. S. Bend
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). See generally O’Gorman, supra note 9,
at 82 (noting the confusion Alexander’s statement created).
53 See Del Bosque v. AT&T Adver., L.P., 441 F. App’x 258, 260 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting
the split).
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state or federal law applies and then perfunctorily applied the relevant
precedent without regard to the substantive goals of Title VII.
1. Fulgence and the Adoption of Federal Law
Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.54 was one of the first cases to apply
federal law. But while the court reached the correct conclusion, it did not
fully consider the appropriateness of developing federal common law with
respect to employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII.
In Fulgence, an employer relied on a settlement reached with its employee
to defend against the employee’s discrimination claim.55 The employee
responded that the agreement was null because they had reached it orally.56
Louisiana law required that all settlements be in writing; federal law
recognized verbal agreements.57 The Fifth Circuit determined that federal
law applied and provided three reasons for its conclusion. First, the case
dealt with the “operation of a Congressional statutory scheme.”58 Second,
applying state law would not further any state interest, but it “might”
undermine Congress’s policy of encouraging settlements.59 And third, the
Supreme Court spoke to the issue in Alexander and “established prerequisites to the validity of settlement agreements in Title VII suits.”60
None of these propositions was particularly fleshed out by the court.
Federal courts frequently develop law in the interstices of federal statutes and
look to various sources to define operative words within those statutes.61 The
Fifth Circuit, however, failed to acknowledge that settlement-enforcement
suits are not obviously part of the “operation of a . . . statutory scheme” and
thus are not analogous to the usual circumstances in which federal common
law persists. Unlike, for example, the type of damages available in a suit
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

662 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court then proceeded to apply the “voluntary and knowing” standard to the oral
agreement and concluded that the settlement was valid. Id. at 1209-10.
61 See Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 438 (3d
Cir. 1993) (Greenberg, J., concurring) (“It has long been assumed that federal courts have the
power to create so-called ‘interstitial’ federal common law to govern issues closely interwoven with
a broad scheme of federal statutory regulation.”). As one commentator explains, “[W]hen a federal
statute refers to preexisting legal concepts that it does not itself define, or when its application
requires answers to questions that written federal law does not resolve, courts often assume that
Congress meant to incorporate uniform rules of general law.” Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of
General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 519 (2006).
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actually brought under Title VII—a gap in the statutory scheme that federal
courts would clearly have the right to stray from state law to fill62—
enforcement of a settlement is a different action from a Title VII claim. The
plaintiff must prove different elements and counter different defenses.63
The Fifth Circuit quickly passed over these meaningful distinctions.
The relatively hasty analysis extended to other parts of the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning, as well. For example, in declaring the lack of any state interest,
the court failed to consider that Louisiana may have preferred that businesses be subject to the same rules for all settlement agreements, regardless
of the underlying claims.64 But even if the court had addressed this, it
would still have been one step short of confronting the more critical issue—
that the “policy of encouraging voluntary settlement[s]”65 to which the
court referred is a means to an end. Crafting rules of decision in a manner
that treated Title VII settlements no differently than any other contracts led
the Fifth Circuit to prioritize the means—voluntary settlement—instead of
the ends—deterring employment discrimination and compensating victims.
The court should have considered that victims of employment discrimination—who likely lack bargaining power and are inexperienced negotiators—
may hastily rush into unfavorable oral settlements; having to read and sign
a written contract, in contrast, may send signals to the victim to be more
hesitant.66
Though the Fifth Circuit arguably reached the correct conclusion in
applying federal law (though not in the particular substantive rule of
decision it chose),67 its explanation for why it chose to apply federal law was
underwhelming. The court’s analysis leaves considerable doubt that suits to
enforce Title VII settlements should be one of the “few and restricted”
instances in which creation of federal common law is appropriate.68 A more
thorough consideration of the appropriateness of developing federal common
62 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999) (articulating the standard
for punitive damages in Title VII cases).
63 See Nelson, supra note 61, at 519-37 (distinguishing between areas widely accepted as
allowing for federal common law and those, such as settlement enforcement claims, where
application of federal common law is more controversial).
64 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (stating that the
impact of application of federal law on commercial relationships should be considered before
federal law is applied).
65 Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209.
66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. c (1981) (explaining that written
contracts provide a “cautionary function” that “guard[s] the promisor against ill-considered action”
(emphasis omitted)).
67 See infra Part IV.
68 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 225-26 (1997) (rejecting the principle that federal common
law should govern the corporate governance of federally chartered savings associations).
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law, which requires courts to take into account the federal interests at
hand,69 would illuminate any conflict between the policy of encouraging
settlements and the mission of Title VII and, in doing so, would potentially
lead the court to craft a more beneficial rule of decision.
2. Morgan and the Use of State Law
The courts that apply state law rely (explicitly or implicitly) on federal
courts’ post–Erie Railroad v. Tompkins70 reluctance to generate common law.71
In Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., the leading case in this
school of thought, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the
superintendent of the defendant–school district had the authority to bind
the school district and enter into an oral settlement.72 The court at times
wavered between applying state and federal law, but the overall message was
that state law should govern such claims.
The Morgan court began its analysis with a discussion of whether “the
existence of a settlement is governed by federal law.”73 The court reasoned
that the Rules of Decision Act,74 which requires state law to govern “except
where . . . Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,” and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(a), which “has been understood to mean that state law applies to
procedural matters in civil rights cases,” militated in favor of applying state
law.75 The court left unaddressed whether Title VII’s connection to the suit
rendered the Rules of Decision Act inapplicable, or whether § 1988(a)—a
statute understood to apply to “procedural matters”—has any bearing on
what law applies to the formation and scope of contracts.76
Despite strongly suggesting that state law should apply, the court ultimately declined to “resolv[e] these tensions.”77 Instead, the court assumed
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See infra Part IV.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir. 2011).
797 F.2d 471, 473-78 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 474.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
Morgan, 797 F.2d at 474-75.
The Morgan court further noted that the Supreme Court has “declined to adopt federal
common law for private disputes, however, even disputes that potentially affect federal interests.”
Id. at 475. However, the persuasive effect of that observation has waned over time because of the
Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. See 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (creating federal
common law in a case between two private parties when a finding of liability would “directly affect
the terms of Government contracts”). While Boyle concerned a connection to a fiscal interest of
the federal government, subsection IV.D.2.b.ii argues that the ability to create federal common
law in cases between private parties should be extended to other strong federal interests,
specifically, to employment discrimination cases.
77 Morgan, 797 F.2d at 476.
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arguendo that federal law should apply, with state law supplying the
content of federal law.78 While this approach edges closer to the analysis
this Comment suggests, the court’s decision to adopt state law rested largely
on the ability of state law to supply consistency for the formation of
contracts, regardless of the content of those contracts. While the court
correctly realized that the application of state law generally facilitates the
formation of contracts because it avoids the “bushwhack[ing]” of repeat
players accustomed to certain rules under state contract law—such as the
superintendent in Morgan79—this Comment urges that the analysis in Title
VII settlement cases should take into account whether the aims of the
employment discrimination statute require a rule that protects the non-repeat
player—the employee—from being “bushwhacked.”80 In other words, the
Morgan court would have done better had it considered whether the adoption of state rules facilitated the goals of Title VII.81
C. The “Voluntary and Knowing” Requirement
Alexander has also sparked a conflict among courts over whether settlements must be reached “voluntarily and knowingly.”82 A few courts have
78 Id. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (“When it is
not necessary to have a national rule, it is necessary not to have one.”)); see also infra subsection
IV.D.2.
79 Similarly, the court asserted that allowing only written settlements—the state rule—would
better further the aim of encouraging settlements by creating certainty. But this seems to be more
of an argument for applying a certain substantive rule of decision, which federal common law
would allow a court to choose, than blindly applying whatever state rule existed. See 797 F.2d at
475-76.
80 To its credit, the court also addressed whether Title VII conferred power on federal courts
to craft federal common law concerning the power of an agent to bind the principal. The court
ultimately concluded that it did not. See id. at 477 (“[I]f the national government possesses the
authority to decide who shall speak for the state or a political subdivision, that power must be
exercised by Congress, at least to the extent of authorizing the creation of a new branch of the
common law.”).
81 This criticism may be undermined by the Morgan court’s observation that federal common
law yielded the same result—namely, allowing invalidation of contracts entered into by an unauthorized agent. See id. at 477-78 (citing United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 351-55 (1901), and Stone
v. Bank of Commerce, 174 U.S. 412, 421 (1899) (finding that “even under principles of federal
common law[,] compromise judgments depend on the actual authority of the person purporting to
compromise the claim”)). Once again, however, those cases addressed generally what rule should
govern the formation of contracts. See id. This Comment encourages courts to consider what rules
would best facilitate Title VII’s aims, even if they end up reaching the same result.
82 Courts that impose a “voluntary and knowing” requirement articulate the test in different
ways. For a discussion, see generally O’Gorman, supra note 9, at 85-99. Waiver of certain federal
constitutional rights must be “intelligent and knowing.” See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
(1969) (creating the standard in the context of a guilty plea), superseded by statute, FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11, as recognized in United States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.3d 1521, 1524 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990); see
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extended the federal “voluntary and knowing” standard to waiver of Title
VII rights with only cursory analysis. For example, the First Circuit relied
on precedent concerning waivers of other federal claims and Alexander when
coming to this conclusion.83 The Second84 and Third85 Circuits have applied
the “knowing and voluntary” requirement without addressing the issue of
whether state law or federal law applies. Courts that have more carefully
considered the issues have reached varied conclusions; the best analyses are
those that consider the impact the chosen rule will have on Title VII’s
substantive aims.
1. Pierce and the Adoption of Federal Law
Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., a Seventh Circuit case,
considered the appropriateness of applying a “voluntary and knowing”
requirement and adopted a federal rule of decision.86 In Pierce, an employer
raised a previous settlement as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff ’s Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)87 claim.88 After determining
that the employee’s state law–based responses to the previous agreement
failed, the Seventh Circuit stated that the “strong congressional purpose . . .
to eradicate discrimination in employment” counseled in favor of looking
beyond state law in certain circumstances.89 The court concluded that
because the employee proceeded without counsel, was of limited education,
and had signed a boilerplate waiver, a totality-of-the-circumstances approach
to determining whether consent was voluntary and knowing was more consistent with congressional purpose than a mere application of state contract
law.90 Accordingly, the court remanded for an application of the totality-ofthe-circumstances approach. And, when the case reached the court a second
also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (“[A] trial court must satisfy itself that the
waiver of . . . constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”). The Alexander Court appeared to
borrow from that standard.
83 See Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding
that a waiver of Title VII rights, “like a release of other federal statutorily created rights, must be
knowing and voluntary” (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974)).
84 E.g., Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1998).
85 E.g., Henson-Miksic v. Potter, 250 F. App’x 509, 511 (3d Cir. 2007).
86 65 F.3d 562, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1995).
87 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2006).
88 65 F.3d at 567. While Pierce involved a claim under the ADEA, the court’s analysis made
clear that it was not distinguishing between the ADEA and Title VII, and the court relied on Title
VII cases in reaching its conclusion. See id. at 570-71 (citing Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
881 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1989), superseded in part by statute, Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-443, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)).
89 Id. at 571.
90 Id.
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time, it affirmed that the test barred enforcement of the employee’s waiver.91
In reaching this result, the court appropriately emphasized Congress’s purpose
to “eradicate discrimination in . . . employment” rather than the pro-settlement
policy.92
2. Makins and the Application of State Law
The D.C. Circuit, in Makins v. District of Columbia, departed from the
Seventh Circuit’s approach by rejecting any role for federal law in enforcement suits.93 In Makins, an employee alleged, in response to the employer’s
defense based on a previous settlement, that her attorney had entered into
the settlement without her consent.94 She argued that Alexander required the
court to craft a federal rule because the settlement at issue concerned Title
VII.95 Specifically, the employee requested that the court stray from state
agency law on the reach of an attorney’s apparent authority in negotiating
settlements, asserting that the scope of apparent authority in Title VII
settlement negotiations must be narrow for the employee’s waiver to truly
be voluntary and knowing.96
To the employee’s dismay, the court characterized Alexander’s “voluntary and knowing requirement” as mere dicta and therefore concluded that
special federal rules for apparent authority would not be created to satisfy
it.97 The court reasoned that state law should generally be applied in
contract cases unless the federal government is the defendant or a statute
confers lawmaking power on federal courts,98 which the court found that
Title VII failed to do.99 Moreover, the court noted that federal law was in
“national disarray,” so no uniformity interest would be served by creating
federal law.100 The court also contended that the District of Columbia
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id.
277 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 547-48.
See infra subsection IV.D.1.
Makins, 277 F.3d at 548. The court, after determining that local law controlled, certified a
question on the validity of the settlement to the D.C. Court of Appeals. Id. at 553.
100 Id. at 548. The court’s assertion that no uniformity interest would be served because
federal law differed from circuit to circuit is misguided. When federal law controls, the power
rests with federal courts to bring the law into conformity with other federal courts or for the
Supreme Court to do so on appeal. However, when state law applies, federal courts lack an
independent means to create uniformity, and the lower courts must apply state law notwithstanding any discordant effect.
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would benefit from lawyers and businesses knowing that the same rule
applied in both federal and local courts.101 The dissent, which agreed with
the majority on the issue of which law to apply, summarized the court’s
conclusion: “[N]othing in the text of Title VII requires that settlement of a
suit thereunder be entered ‘voluntarily and knowingly.’”102 Yet again, this
analysis subordinates the underlying right to be free from discrimination
and finds contract concerns to be of paramount importance.103
D. The End Result: General Confusion
These cases have generated confusion about which rules should govern
Title VII settlements and have led to missed opportunities to cure the
ailments that the pro-settlement trend has created. For example, Morgan
and Pierce are both Seventh Circuit decisions; while they are not technically
incompatible,104 the two decisions are not models of clarity.105 As a result of
this confusion, resources are wasted and courts miss opportunities to create
federal rules that respond to the needs of Title VII claimants.106

101
102

See id.
Id. at 554 (Henderson, J., dissenting). Although Makins dealt with a case in which the
employee retained counsel, its reasoning suggests that the “knowing and voluntary” standard
would not be applied even in the absence of counsel.
103 Cf. Horton v. Norfolk S. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (M.D.N.C.) (applying ordinary
contract principles as a matter of course, without considering whether the employee had representation or whether any other factor employed in a “knowing and voluntary” standard was present),
aff’d, 199 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1999).
104 State agency law can still apply to settlements while courts assess—under federal principles—the totality of the circumstances under which parties entered a contract.
105 See, e.g., White v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 12-001, 2012 WL 5497853, at *5 (N.D.
Ind. Nov. 13, 2012) (noting that the Seventh Circuit applies state law to determine the validity of
oral contracts but also looks to whether the contract was entered knowingly and voluntarily in the
context of employment discrimination settlements). One district court has declared the Seventh
Circuit’s law on the issue “surprisingly unclear.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Borst, No. 03-0274, 2006 WL
1308118, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2006).
106 In Snider v. Circle K Corp., the Tenth Circuit concluded that federal common law governed the resolution of a breach of settlement claim and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a
jury trial. 923 F.2d 1404, 1407-08 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Tenth Circuit and its district
courts have since strayed from this holding. Compare Fender v. Kan. Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 168 F.
Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (D. Kan. 2001) (applying state law), with Sump v. Pamida, Inc., No. 97-4085,
1998 WL 1054949, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 25, 1998) (applying federal law). The consequence of this
ambiguity is illustrated in Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826 (10th Cir. 2005), in which the
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that federal law “[g]enerally” applies, but proceeded to apply state
law without considering the consequences, because neither party argued against the application of
state law. Id. at 830-31.
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III. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN SETTLEMENT ENFORCEMENT
This Part considers the procedural obstacles facing enforcement of Title
VII settlements in federal and state courts. Though an employer attempting
to enforce a settlement can raise the existence of the previous agreement as
a defense in any subsequent suit,107 an employee attempting to enforce an
agreement must clear additional hurdles. First, the employee must establish
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; second, if the employee works for
a state, sovereign immunity may bar certain types of relief; and third,
certain jurisdictions require that the employee receive a “right to sue” letter
from the EEOC before she may file suit.
A. Federal Court Jurisdiction
An employee seeking to enforce a settlement agreement will encounter
considerable difficulties in accessing the federal courts. Of course, state
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and therefore always remain an
option.108 State courts, on the one hand, may offer lower filing fees, have
lower pleadings standards, be more plaintiff-friendly, or provide other
reasons for the plaintiff to prefer that forum.109 On the other hand, plaintiffs may prefer federal procedural rules, federal discovery,110 unelected
judges,111 and—in the case of Title VII claims specifically—jurors drawn
from areas beyond where the local employer conducts its business.112
For those plaintiffs who prefer a federal forum, subject matter jurisdiction is often a bar. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,113 and
the plaintiff who sues bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction.114 In
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, the Supreme Court held
that a suit to enforce a settlement falls outside of federal court jurisdiction

107 Complications similar to those an employee faces will arise in the less common case in
which an employer sues because of an employee’s alleged breach.
108 E.g., In re Hyde, 255 P.3d 411, 414 (Okla. 2011); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362,
1401 (1953).
109 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 550 (2010).
110 Cf. Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases,
41 VAND. L. REV. 923, 939 (1988).
111 See Gordon N. Griffin, Note, Reinventing Adequacy: The Need for Standardized Regulation,
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 603, 610 n.45 (2010).
112 Cf. Maggie McKinley, Note, Plenary No Longer: How the Fourteenth Amendment “Amended”
Congressional Jurisdiction-Stripping Power, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1231 (2011).
113 E.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
114 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012).
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unless there is an independent basis for jurisdiction.115 The parties, in a state
agency law case, originally made their way into federal court via diversity
jurisdiction, settled, and requested a voluntary dismissal, which the district
court granted.116 The plaintiff in the original suit then sued to enforce the
settlement.117 The Supreme Court determined that the district court judge’s
“mere awareness and approval of the terms of the settlement agreement”
were insufficient to create jurisdiction in the subsequent enforcement suit.118
The Court did note, though, that there are other ways to establish an
“independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”119 Employees seeking to enforce
Title VII settlements must rely on the following alternative routes.
1. Requesting the Federal Court Retain Jurisdiction
One method the Court proposed is for the parties to request that the
original court retain jurisdiction over the settlement.120 This solution,
however, fails to address two problems in the Title VII context. First, a
number of settlements occur before an initial suit is even filed in federal or
state court; many claims settle after an EEOC charge is filed, after arbitration, or after independent negotiations between employer and employee.121
An employee who waived her claim in such instances would have no
opportunity to request that a court retain jurisdiction. Thus, if aware of this
potential solution, she may be less willing to enter into a settlement until
suit is filed, increasing costs and time as well as creating tension that will
make it less likely that a favorable settlement will be reached. If unaware of
her ability to request that a court retain jurisdiction, whether because she
has no counsel or because she has inexperienced counsel, the employee may
settle without doing so and potentially face unnecessary difficulty in a later
attempt to enforce her rights.122
Defendants’ strong preference for confidential settlements creates the
second problem. A court weary of the consequences of secret settlements
115 See 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994) (commenting that one such basis would be if the district court
retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement).
116 Id. at 377.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 381.
119 Id. at 382.
120 Id. at 381-82.
121 Cf. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
122 Moreover, even the process of ensuring that a court retains jurisdiction has created confusion. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing Settlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36
IND. L. REV. 33, 38-43 (2003) (describing inconsistency in lower courts’ determinations of when
jurisdiction is retained).
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may take the initiative to make them public. In Gambale v. Deutsche Bank
AG, the district court relied on its “inherent power to control access to [its]
records” and ordered unsealed documents connected to a settlement over
which the court had retained jurisdiction.123 The Second Circuit affirmed
the power of district courts to allow public access to previously confidential
documents in certain circumstances.124 After Gambale, no defendant insistent
on maintaining confidentiality would risk filing settlement documents with
the court and requesting that it retain jurisdiction.125 Thus, a plaintiff will
want the court to retain jurisdiction to be assured that the settlement’s
terms will materialize, and the defendant will want to avoid that occurrence
to guarantee confidentiality. While a plaintiff might be able to leverage the
defendant’s desire to maintain confidentiality to demand increased consideration, the agreement would lack the protection of a federal court’s jurisdiction.
2. Establishing Diversity Jurisdiction
Another independent basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction. Yet, as Kokkonen itself demonstrates, even if diversity jurisdiction
existed at the outset of a suit, it may be unavailable for an action seeking
enforcement of the settlement agreement.126 A significant number of
settlements fall below the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction.127 One study found that the mean settlement for
employment discrimination claims was $65,950,128 and another found that
the mean was $54,651 for single plaintiffs, with a median of $30,000.129 In
those cases, diversity jurisdiction is unavailable.
3. Establishing Supplemental Jurisdiction
Supplemental jurisdiction presents a third avenue into federal court. However, supplemental jurisdiction will require, first, that the plaintiff suffered
additional discrimination and, second, that the subsequent discrimination was
123 No. 02-4791, 2003 WL 21511851, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003) (footnote omitted), aff ’d,
377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
124 See Gambale, 377 F.3d at 142.
125 Kotkin, supra note 21, at 958.
126 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994) (“Absent
[court action embodying the settlement contract in its dismissal order or retaining jurisdiction
over the settlement agreement], enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts,
unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction”).
127 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
128 Schwab & Heise, supra note 3, at 942.
129 Kotkin, supra note 4, at 144.
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sufficiently related to the settled claims.130 The plaintiffs who lack an
additional subsequent federal claim—and therefore cannot use supplemental
jurisdiction—are also those for whom the statute of limitations for their
original claims may present a substantial obstacle should they decide to
bring a new Title VII suit based on the original claims once pre-litigation
attempts to enforce the suit have faltered.131
4. General Federal Question Jurisdiction
A court could potentially determine that an enforcement suit arises under federal law because of its connection to the original Title VII claim.132
However, in Kokkonen, the Court rejected the idea that there is federal
question jurisdiction simply because dismissal of the earlier federal suit was
part of the consideration for the settlement agreement: “No federal statute
makes that connection (if it constitutionally could) the basis for federalcourt jurisdiction over the contract dispute.”133 Importantly, the underlying
federal suit in Kokkonen was a state law claim brought in diversity, not a
federal cause of action.
Nonetheless, some courts have latched onto Kokkonen’s reasoning to declare that federal courts lack jurisdiction over Title VII settlementenforcement suits. For example, in Atkinson v. Sellers, the Fourth Circuit
dismissed a suit to enforce the settlement of a Title VII claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because it found that the plaintiff alleged “only a
breach of contract,” and Kokkonen directly controlled the case.134 In so
holding, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff “could obtain relief on
his breach of contract claim without reference to federal law at all,” and
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, codified by § 1367, allows
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims that share a “common nucleus of
operative fact” with a federal question claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1367), as recognized in Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087, 1097
n.10 (5th Cir. 1992). Thus, a plaintiff must already have an independent federal claim that opens
the door to federal court.
131 Cf. Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(acknowledging that the doctrine of laches might ultimately bar the plaintiff ’s enforcement suit).
132 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Courts have found that Title VII’s independent jurisdictional provision, which allows courts to hear claims “brought under” Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3),
provides jurisdiction for settlement-enforcement suits, as well. E.g., Eatmon v. Bristol Steel &
Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1985); see also infra notes 133-36 and accompanying
text; cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006) (noting that federal courts may hear
Title VII claims under general federal question jurisdiction as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3)).
133 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
134 233 F. App’x 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2007).
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recovery did not “depend on the resolution of a substantial question of
federal law.”135 The Tenth Circuit took a similar approach in Morris v. City of
Hobart, finding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction because state
contract law governed the suit.136 Implicit in the reasoning of both the
Morris and Atkinson courts is that general federal question jurisdiction would
be proper if federal common law governed the settlement claim.137
Other courts have relied on Title VII’s specific jurisdictional grant, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3),138 to find jurisdiction when employees sue to enforce
predetermination139 and conciliation140 agreements that the EEOC has the
power to enforce.141 In Ruedlinger v. Jarrett, the Seventh Circuit built on
previous decisions that found that, despite the lack of explicit congressional
authorization, federal courts have jurisdiction over EEOC enforcements of
settlements.142 The court reasoned that private enforcement actions143 would
further the policy of encouraging voluntary compliance with Title VII through

135
136

Id. at 272-73.
39 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 1994). In doing so, the court distinguished an earlier case in
which it found that federal law governed certain issues in Title VII settlement enforcement suits,
such as the availability of a jury. See id. at 1112 n.5 (distinguishing Snider v. Circle K Corp., 923 F.2d
1404 (10th Cir. 1991), on the basis that Snider “did not purport to decide the question of subject
matter jurisdiction”).
137 For a helpful discussion of when enforcement creates a “substantial question of federal
law,” see Charles R. Calleros, Reconciling the Goals of Federalism with the Policy of Title VII: SubjectMatter Jurisdiction in Judicial Enforcement of EEOC Conciliation Agreements, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV.
257, 264-88 (1985). Calleros discusses the federal question doctrine and concludes that whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists depends on the terms of the settlement agreement. Id.
138 See supra note 132.
139 Predetermination agreements are settlements entered into by parties before the EEOC
makes a finding of reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred. See EEOC v. Henry Beck
Co., 729 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing the EEOC’s regulations, particularly 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.20 (2012), which provides that the EEOC may encourage the parties to settle the charge on
mutually agreeable terms prior to issuing a determination as to reasonable cause).
140 Conciliation agreements are settlement agreements negotiated and executed after the
EEOC has found reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred but before either the
EEOC or the employee files suit. See Calleros, supra note 137, at 258 n.6; see also EEOC v. Liberty
Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Conciliation agreements are voluntary contracts
containing terms upon which the employer, the employee, and the EEOC agree.”).
141 See Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d at 305-06 (holding that “where an employer allegedly
breaches a predetermination settlement agreement after voluntarily entering into it, and the
Commission seeks enforcement of that agreement only, . . . the suit is brought directly under Title
VII, and the United States District Courts have jurisdiction”).
142 106 F.3d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d at 1040). In Liberty
Trucking, the Seventh Circuit held that Congress “intended to provide the EEOC with a federal
forum to enforce conciliation agreements,” and the lack of explicit authorization did not prevent
the court from exercising jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Id.
143 Ruedlinger considered the enforcement suit to be a type of Title VII claim, not a contract
claim. 106 F.3d at 214.
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conciliation agreements in the same manner as EEOC enforcement actions.144
Accordingly, it found jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).145
Though invoking § 2000e-5(f)(3) would appear to solve the jurisdiction
problem, it is a limited solution. First, it is questionable whether the court’s
policy justifications for exercising jurisdiction—asserting that it will further
voluntary compliance—would withstand scrutiny. In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
the Supreme Court articulated a very narrow understanding of § 2000e5(f)(3).146 It stated that Congress included this section because, at the time
Title VII was enacted, § 1331 had a $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement and § 2000e-5(f)(3) contained no jurisdictional amount.147 Since Congress amended § 1331 to eliminate that requirement, the Court explained that
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) “has served simply to underscore Congress’ intention to provide
a federal forum for the adjudication of Title VII claims.”148 Lower courts’
reliance on § 2000e-5(f)(3) implies that they found § 1331 insufficient to
justify jurisdiction; however, if the understanding articulated in Arbaugh is
correct, § 2000e-5(f)(3) offers no more than does § 1331.
Second, even if Arbaugh does not undermine the basis for jurisdiction in
some instances, no federal court has extended § 2000e-5(f)(3) to allow
enforcement of a settlement in which the EEOC did not offer assistance. As
one court stated to explain the reach of its holding, “enforcement of an
EEOC predetermination settlement agreement is a civil action brought
directly under Title VII.”149 This suggests that those employees who settle
before EEOC involvement or after suit is filed and without the help of the
EEOC are out of luck. Their suits may not be viewed as “brought directly
under Title VII,” and thus § 2000e-5(f)(3) will lend no help.
Of course, the EEOC can enforce certain breached agreements even
when the employee is unable to do so.150 As Ruedlinger and similar cases
suggest, courts appear to accept that the EEOC may sue in federal court to

144 Id. at 215. The court noted that “[t]he congressional goal of enforcing Title VII through
conciliation and voluntary compliance would be hampered if employees could not seek to enforce
in federal courts conciliation agreements between themselves, their employers and the EEOC.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This properly views settlements as a means to
promote the goals of Title VII.
145 Id.; see also Owens v. West, 182 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187-90 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding jurisdiction
over a predetermination-agreement-enforcement suit); Francisco v. West, No. 98-3007, 2001 WL
563793, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2001) (same).
146 546 U.S. 500, 505-06 (2006).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
149 Owens, 182 F. Supp. at 190 (emphasis added).
150 See supra Section I.B.
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enforce conciliation agreements151 and predetermination agreements.152 In
addition, courts do not seem to distinguish EEOC enforcement of conciliation from predetermination agreements in cases where the EEOC is not a
party, reasoning that the ultimate goal of furthering voluntary compliance is
advanced in both instances.153
However, the dearth of case law on this issue and the unavoidable fact
that the EEOC has limited resources154 suggest that EEOC enforcement is
not a viable answer to courts that narrowly construe jurisdiction. Moreover,
the EEOC does not enforce agreements in which it was never involved.155
Again, this means employees who negotiate without the help of the
EEOC—and, therefore, plausibly the most vulnerable type of potential
plaintiffs—may have the most difficulty enforcing settlement agreements in
federal court.156

151 See, e.g., EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 714 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Although Title VII
does not explicitly provide the EEOC with the authority to seek enforcement of conciliation
agreements in federal court, it would be antithetical to Congress’ strong commitment to the
conciliatory process if there were no federal forum in which the EEOC could enforce such
agreements.”); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1040 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[W]e
conclude that Congress intended to provide the EEOC with a federal forum to enforce conciliation agreements.”); see also Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1508 (11th
Cir. 1985) (“The EEOC can go directly to court to enforce . . . agreements [into which it entered],
as soon as it believes the agreement has been breached.”).
152 See, e.g., EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (treating predetermination agreements and conciliation agreements the same in situations where the EEOC
“seeks enforcement of a specific agreement without any ruling on the underlying charge of
intentional employment discrimination”). But see EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 608
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding that generally the EEOC may not sue to enforce predetermination
agreements).
153 See, e.g., EEOC v. Bay Ridge Toyota, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 167, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(stating that it is “settled law” that the EEOC may enforce conciliation agreements regardless of
whether the EEOC was party to the agreement).
154 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
155 See, e.g., Tucker v. Astrue, 738 F. Supp. 2d 835, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiff’s request to enforce a settlement agreement into which the plaintiff entered through a union
grievance process).
156 See Berry v. Gutierrez, No. 08-459, 2008 WL 4572510, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 8, 2008) (noting
that the EEOC dismissed the plaintiff’s request to enforce a settlement because “the EEOC
cannot take jurisdiction over grievance settlement agreements outside the EEO process” (citation
omitted)). Settlements that the EEOC helped negotiate, however, are treated differently. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Regal-Beloit Corp., No. 06-568, 2007 WL 5614093, at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 1, 2007)
(“The EEOC is a federal agency and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
This Court has jurisdiction to consider EEOC's motion to enforce the settlement.”); cf. Morris v.
City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing five cases in which federal
courts found jurisdiction over a settlement enforcement suit as involving the EEOC and stating
that “settlement contracts between private parties do not implicate the same degree of congressional concern”).
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B. State Sovereign Immunity
Whether federal or state law governs, settlement enforcement also has
important implications for state employees, who face the additional obstacle
of state sovereign immunity when attempting to enforce settlements against
state employers.157 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Supreme Court held that Title
VII validly abrogated state sovereign immunity as an exercise of Congress’s
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.158 Hence, any
state employee may collect monetary damages and certain other relief,
normally barred by sovereign immunity, in a Title VII suit against the
state.159 A private citizen suing for a breach of contract under state law is
usually subject to the whim of the state, which may choose not to waive its
immunity.160 Therefore, when an employee engages in a settlement with her
state employer, she risks being unable to enforce the agreement if the court
finds that state law controls the suit.
However, if federal law governs the enforcement suit because the suit
itself is a continued vindication of Title VII rights, then state sovereign
immunity should remain abrogated. For example, in Klein v. Board of Regents,
a female professor at the University of Wisconsin filed an enforcement suit
after the University failed to assign her to a certain position, as agreed to in
an earlier settlement of a gender discrimination claim mediated by the
EEOC.161 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that sovereign immunity
would normally bar a breach of contract suit against the state and declared
157 Federal sovereign immunity is not a bar. A number of federal courts have held that federal
sovereign immunity precludes enforcement of Title VII settlements against the United States in
the district courts. See, e.g., Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the
Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to hear these enforcement suits. See, e.g., Holmes v.
United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Moreover, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 (2012) provides
procedures for federal employees who allege that the federal government has failed to comply with
the terms of a settlement.
158 427 U.S. 445, 452-53, 456 (1976).
159 In federal court and in state court under federal causes of action, the Eleventh Amendment bars “retrospective relief” against a state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); see also, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261, 281-82 (1997) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit to enjoin the state
from enforcing certain land regulations because the suit amounted to a quiet title action).
160 See, e.g., Tex. Natural Res. Conserv’n Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2002).
161 666 N.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). The record did not reveal whether the
agreement was a predetermination agreement or a conciliation agreement, see id. at 69 n.2, and
presumably the court found any distinction between the two irrelevant. Indeed, the court cited
Ruedlinger v. Jarrett with approval, and that case expressly rejected any meaningful distinction
between the two types of agreements for the purposes of determining the role of federal law. See id.
(citing 106 F.3d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e see no relevant distinction between conciliation
agreements and pre-determination settlement agreements for purposes of jurisdiction under Title
VII . . . .”)).
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that whether the suit was “part of [the plaintiff’s] initial Title VII claim”
“decides whether the [defendant’s] assertion of sovereign immunity will
hold.”162 The court ultimately found that the suit to enforce the settlement
was brought under Title VII and sovereign immunity would not attach.163
The Supreme Court of Alabama reached a different result in Smith v.
Tillman, a suit in which the EEOC had no connection to the underlying
settlement.164 There, an African American prison guard,165 who had waived
his Title VII claims in a previous settlement, sued to enforce the agreement.166 The court, like the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, acknowledged that
sovereign immunity would not be an issue if the suit arose under Title VII.167
However, it concluded that because the EEOC was not involved in the
agreement, Klein was distinguishable and the suit was brought solely under
state law.168 Therefore, the plaintiff could not use Title VII as a means to
escape sovereign immunity.169
Ultimately, the Smith court found that the specifics of Alabama law allowed
the plaintiff to bring suit, because the settlement agreement compelled the
defendant to perform a “ministerial act,”170 but this nuance highlights the
troubling aspect of that court’s preliminary finding. Courts that treat suits
to enforce settlements as state law contract claims leave the employee in a
bind: she is forced to rely on that state’s specific sovereign immunity
doctrine when suit is filed in state court or to rely on the narrow exceptions

162
163

Id. at 71 n.4, 72.
See id. at 72. (“Accordingly, we conclude that Klein’s action is part of her initial Title VII
claim, and as such, sovereign immunity does not lie.”).
164 958 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 2006).
165 Brief of Appellant at 2, Smith v. Tillman, 958 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 2006) (No. 1051108), 2006
WL 5309646.
166 Smith, 958 So.2d at 335.
167 Id. at 337-38.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 337. Thus, the employee who navigates the Title VII landscape without help from
the EEOC not only faces a more difficult time getting into federal court, but also encounters
sovereign immunity obstacles in obtaining relief via settlement under state law. See also Ning v.
Okla. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, No. 96-6372, 113 F.3d 1246, at *3 (10th Cir. May 30, 1997) (acknowledging, but not ruling on, the argument that a “[s]tate’s Eleventh Amendment immunity was
abrogated on the basis that an EEOC-brokered agreement arises under Title VII whereas a
privately-settled Title VII action does not”); cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1972)
(interpreting Title VII in light of the type of people who invoke the statute’s protection and
eschewing a proposed procedural “technicalit[y]” as “inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which
laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process”).
170 958 So.2d at 338.
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to the Eleventh Amendment when suit is filed in federal court (if there is
federal court jurisdiction at all).171
The potential for injustice is illustrated in Sharafeldin v. Maryland,
Department of Safety and Correctional Services.172 There, a “black male of Sudanese origin [who was a] practicing Muslim” alleged that coworkers harassed
him over a five-year period, and he filed “at least five” different charges
with the EEOC before entering into a settlement without the assistance of a
lawyer.173 Harassment allegedly continued for three years after the settlement—
in violation of the agreement—and the employee sued to enforce the settlement agreement.174 The district court concluded that enforcement of the
settlement arose under state contract law rather than under Title VII.175
Accordingly, the court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit,
and the employee’s waiver of his original claims was in vain.176
Congress created Title VII to allow employees a right to be free from
discrimination regardless of where their employer is located or in what
171 Cf. Peery v. CSB Behavioral Health Sys., No. 106-172, 2008 WL 4425364, at *5-6 (S.D.
Ga. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that, in a suit alleging breach of an FMLA settlement, the state
agency defendant lacked immunity from suit under Georgia law because the contract was written,
but acknowledging that the plaintiff would be without a remedy were the settlement an oral one).
172 94 F. Supp. 2d 680 (D. Md. 2000).
173 Id. at 683.
174 Id. at 683-84.
175 Id. at 686.
176 Id. at 686-87; see also Chi v. Bd. of Educ., No. 93-3569, 1995 WL 131288, at *4 (D. Md.
Feb. 6, 1995) (rejecting plaintiff-employee’s retroactive claims arising from an allegedly breached
settlement of a Title VII suit as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but allowing plaintiffemployee’s claims for prospective relief to proceed); cf. Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 685 F. Supp. 2d
1140, 1156 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that a non-Title VII settlement agreement arose under state
contract law and the Eleventh Amendment therefore prevented the court from exercising
jurisdiction over the claim), rev’d in part on other grounds, 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012). But cf.
Williams v. Lane, 818 F. Supp. 1212, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that entry into a settlement
agreement waived any future Eleventh Amendment defense in an enforcement action). One
potential way to avoid this problem is to include a provision in the settlement agreement requiring
that the state waive its sovereign immunity in any enforcement action. Cf. Alison Brill, Note,
Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 679 (2008) (suggesting that prisoners settling claims under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act may avoid enforcement problems by including a provision waiving state
sovereign immunity). However, as the above-referenced cases make clear, employees will not
always have such foresight when settling. Sharafeldin illustrates this point, as well, as the settlement
agreement there allowed for enforcement by “courts,” but the district court rejected that this
constituted a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity because it did not clearly allow for
enforcement by “federal courts.” See 94 F. Supp. 2d at 686-87 (emphasis added) (citing Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[A] state may waive its sovereign immunity, but only ‘by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room
for any other reasonable construction.’”). Moreover, even if the state consented to be sued in federal
court in a case like Sharafeldin, the plaintiff would be without an avenue into federal court, as subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. E.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012).
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forum the employee sued. The absence of federal rules of decision governing enforcement suits undermines that aim. A plaintiff choosing to sue in
state court is limited by that state’s sovereign immunity doctrine, and a
plaintiff suing in federal court is limited by the Eleventh Amendment.
Even if the plaintiff could bring a new Title VII claim because of a breach,177
the statute of limitations on the original injuries or similar procedural hurdles
may pose difficulties;178 additional expenses will accrue; she will have to wait
longer to have her rights vindicated; and, as was the case with the employee in
Sharafeldin, there is a risk of being subjected to continued discrimination.179
C. The Counterintuitive Exhaustion Requirement
Though less substantial than the two prior obstacles, the third roadblock
for employees seeking to enforce settlement agreements is exhausting
administrative requirements. Before an employee may sue under Title VII,
she must file a charge with the EEOC, attempt conciliation, and obtain a
“right to sue” letter.180 Courts have reached different conclusions about
whether employees must go through the same process before filing suit to
enforce a settlement agreement. However, an examination of the purpose of
filing charges demonstrates that no similar requirement should attach as a
prerequisite to filing a settlement-enforcement suit.
Courts that require exhaustion appear confused about the purpose of the
administrative requirements. In Blank v. Donovan, the Ninth Circuit held
that exhaustion was a requirement before a plaintiff could bring his “breach

177 See Ruedlinger v. Jarrett, 106 F.3d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1997); cf. Robles v. United States,
No. 84-3635, 1990 WL 155545, at *6 (D.D.C. July 20, 1990) (“[E]ven those who view a right to
enforce a settlement agreement as not presenting a question under Title VII or a federal question
agree that such agreements create enforceable rights. The question is where to enforce them.”).
178 Cf. Wiley v. Paulson, No. 05-724, 2008 WL 2845299, at *4 & n.3 (N.D. Tex. July 16,
2008) (holding that an allegation of a breach of settlement was insufficient to allow a plaintiff to
revive the original Title VII claims, and refusing to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint
because the case was already three years old).
179 One could take issue with the analysis in this subsection by arguing that a majority of
states voluntarily waive sovereign immunity for contract claims. See Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ.,
951 S.W.2d 401, 419-20 (Tex. 1997) (Enoch, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and statutes). Such a
counterargument overlooks three issues: (1) though some states waive immunity in certain
instances, such as Alabama in the instance of ministerial acts, that does not equate to a blanket
waiver of immunity; (2) that some states, or even most, waive immunity in some instances still
leaves employees outside those states unaccounted for; and (3) a state’s waiver of immunity in its
own court does not translate to waiver in federal court. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677 n.19
(declaring that waiver in state court has no bearing on whether a state waived immunity in federal
court as well).
180 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
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of contract action.”181 The plaintiff sued to enforce a settlement agreement,
to which the EEOC was a party, without exhausting administrative remedies.182 The court reasoned that “[t]he purpose of Title VII is to provide an
opportunity to reach a voluntary settlement of an employment discrimination dispute,” and this aim would be better advanced if an employee had to
attempt conciliation before suing for breach.183 Accordingly, it dismissed
the suit.184 However, the court’s articulation of Title VII’s “purpose”
overlooks its true aims—facilitating work environments in which employees
are free from discrimination and compensating harmed employees.185
The exhaustion requirement creates two odd results. First, as noted by
the dissent in Chandler v. Vulcan Materials Co., in which the Sixth Circuit
affirmed a district court’s holding that exhaustion is required to enforce a
settlement to which the EEOC is not a signatory,186 the employer’s alleged
breach evidences that voluntary compliance will not work.187 Requiring
employees to go through the conciliation process a second time (and
potentially more often if other breaches occur) places an unfair burden on
the employee and enables the employer to delay compliance.188
Second, the exhaustion requirement risks that a federal court would also
mandate exhaustion where the breach of a settlement agreement was
governed by state law. For example, in Hunter v. Ohio Veterans Home, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which sits in a circuit
181
182
183
184

780 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 810; see also Parsons v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 741 F.2d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1984)
(holding that exhaustion is required before an employee may enforce a settlement to which the
EEOC was a party).
185 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
186 81 F. App’x 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2003).
187 See id. at 543 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“The goal of voluntary compliance was met when [the
employees’] initial claims about discrimination in training were resolved by conciliation.”).
188 The Supreme Court refused to require a similar “procedural technicality” in Love v. Pullman
Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972). In Love, the plaintiff-employee sent the EEOC a “letter of inquiry.”
Id. at 523-24. Rather than formally filing the letter, the EEOC, in compliance with Title VII’s
procedural requirements, first notified a state agency that had the power to help the employee
obtain relief. Id. at 524. When the state agency communicated that it had no intention to act on
the complaint, the EEOC filed the letter as a charge, which eventually led to the employee filing
suit. Id. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the employee should have refiled the charge with the EEOC
after the state agency disclaimed interest and that his failure to do so warranted dismissal. See id.
at 524-25. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the purpose of the procedural requirements
is “to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints” and the
purpose “to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of those complaints” had both been met.
Id. at 526. This same reasoning is applicable to the filing of a second charge after an employer has
breached a settlement agreement. The purpose of allowing the parties a chance at voluntary
compliance has already been satisfied.
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that requires exhaustion, held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
a claim alleging breach of a settlement agreement because it found that the
employee’s complaint was “fundamentally based on a breach of contract, a
state cause of action.”189 If the claim fell within the Hunter court’s supplemental or diversity jurisdiction, it would presumably require federal
exhaustion before the state claim could proceed. This would be an anomalous result that, as explained above, serves no useful purpose.190
In contrast, other courts have held that exhaustion of administrative
remedies is unnecessary. For example, in Cisneros v. ABC Rail Corp., the
Tenth Circuit relied on the same reasoning as the Chandler dissent: “The
goal of voluntary compliance with Title VII . . . was met when [the plaintiff’s] discrimination claim was resolved by conciliation. What [the plaintiff]
now seeks is compliance with that agreement.”191 Not only is this result
more consistent with the justification for requiring an initial filing with the
EEOC, but it also removes the abnormal imposition of a federal prerequisite in cases where state law governs.
In sum, the procedural laws governing breach of Title VII settlement
agreements, much like the substantive law, is far from uniform. As a result,
plaintiffs have difficulty getting their claims into federal court, are often
subjected to unfriendly state sovereign immunity law, and may be forced to
undertake unnecessary procedures.
IV. USING FEDERAL LAW
A number of the problems discussed above would be mitigated if federal
law governed enforcement of Title VII settlements.192 This Part addresses

189 272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694-96 (N.D. Ohio 2003); see also, e.g., Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d
856, 864 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that a settlement-enforcement suit is “essentially a contract
action”); Cook v. City of Pomona, 884 F. Supp. 1457, 1462-63 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no federal
jurisdiction over a “private settlement agreement”).
190 But see Calleros, supra note 137, at 288 (arguing that to not require exhaustion would
“contravene federal statutory policy by circumventing congressionally mandated procedures and
invoking the processes of the federal courts on a charge that might otherwise have been resolved
prior to commencement of a suit brought directly under Title VII”).
191 217 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2000); see also, e.g., Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of Educ., 126 F.3d
347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1433, 1441
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (same). The EEOC was not a party to the agreement at issue in Cisneros. Some
courts have also held that exhaustion was not required even when the EEOC was party to the
agreement. See, e.g., Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1508 (11th Cir. 1985).
192 Obviously, a federal statute addressing these problems would end the matter. See Parness
& Walker, supra note 122, at 54 (“Many of the difficulties with federal settlement enforcement
proceedings can be reduced by new written federal laws.”). This Comment focuses on the appropriateness of courts taking steps to remedy the problems in the absence of congressional action.
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the appropriateness of crafting federal common law, considering both its
benefits and its compatibility with Supreme Court precedent. While
acknowledging that the use of federal common law finds little support in the
weight of authority, this Part nevertheless suggests that courts should begin
to develop federal rules of decision tailored to Title VII’s substantive aims.
Indeed, it is important to remember that the policy of encouraging settlements is not an end in itself, but a means to ensure compliance with the
antidiscrimination goals of Title VII.
A. Impact on the Consequences of Settlements and Doctrinal Confusion
If federal law governed breach-of-settlement claims, courts could create
rules that account for the considerable impact that settlements—confidential
or otherwise—have had on Title VII. For example, when employees are
being unduly pressured into settlements or oral agreements to settle, it may
be wise to construct a federal rule refusing to recognize such settlements,
even when state law would do so.193 Likewise, a totality-of-the-circumstances
test for determining whether the employee entered into a settlement voluntarily and knowingly would help to ensure that the employee truly considers
the settlement adequate compensation (or is actually willing to accept objectively inadequate compensation).
As Pierce v. Atchison demonstrates, the totality-of-the-circumstances test
can serve an important role in ensuring that employees are on equal footing
during settlements.194 Application of federal law would enable federal courts
to craft other rules as necessary;195 for example, where the aims of Title VII
do not require special rules, courts would not have to create contract principles from whole cloth but could apply already existing federal common law.196
193 Cf. Morgan v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is ironic
that most of the cases that apply federal law to declare oral settlements effective do so to the
detriment of plaintiffs under Title VII.”).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
195 The precise substance of the many rules of decision involved in contract cases is beyond
the scope of this Comment. It should be noted, though, that the rule created need not favor the
employee in the case in which the rule is crafted. Instead, the rules should focus on furthering the
aims of Title VII in the long term. Cf. Morgan, 797 F.2d at 476 (“If the success of the . . . action
were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate
rule then would always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially
irrelevant.” (quoting Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978))).
196 See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (noting
that the Labor Management Relations Act allows federal courts to develop federal common law
for alleged contract violations between employers and unions); Sellers v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 627
F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “federal common law principles of contract interpretation apply” to agreements made pursuant to ERISA).
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B. Impact on Jurisdictional Problems
The use of federal contract principles to further the aims of Title VII
would also address the jurisdictional problems facing plaintiffs in Title VII
settlement-enforcement suits. Because application of federal principles would
govern a plaintiff ’s claim, federal courts could exercise general federal question jurisdiction.197 To prevail, the plaintiff would have to prove elements
that arise under federal law198 without reference to state law.199 The claim
would, therefore, fall within district courts’ federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,200 because “[f]ederal common law articulated in
rules fashioned by federal court decisions are also ‘laws’ under § 1331.”201
This avenue would render the distinctions between predetermination
agreements, conciliation agreements, and other settlements irrelevant, and
make the level of the EEOC’s involvement a nonissue.202 Employees would
not need to rely on the flimsy support offered by § 2000e-5(f)(3).203 Moreover, the application of federal law would ensure that those employees who

197 In Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, Justice Breyer argued in dissent that
federal question jurisdiction existed as long as federal law applied, even if state law rules of
decision were used in lieu of developing federal principles. 547 U.S. 677, 712-13 (2006) (Breyer, J.
dissenting); see also infra Section IV.D. The majority, however, rejected the reasoning and held
that “[u]nless and until” the party invoking federal jurisdiction demonstrates a “significant conflict
between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of state law,” “there is no cause
to displace state law, much less to lodge this case in federal court.” Empire, 547 U.S. at 693
(majority opinion) (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 150
(2d Cir. 2005) (Sack, J., concurring) (alteration removed)).
198 See Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1667, 1677 (2008) (stating that the two main theories for jurisdiction under § 1331 are when
(1) federal law creates the cause of action and (2) “an element of the claim necessarily requires the
construction of federal law”).
199 One commentator has argued that jurisdiction over enforcement of conciliation agreements depends on the terms of the agreements. See Calleros, supra note 137, at 270-88. If the
agreement required that the employer comply with Title VII, then “[a] federal question would
arise” in determining whether the employer complied. Id. at 286 (emphasis omitted). However, if
the agreement merely entitled the employee to some compensation or job placement, then
compliance could be resolved “without reference to federal law.” Id. at 270.
200 See id. at 297 (“[A]n action seeking . . . enforcement may yet ‘arise under’ federal law
within the meaning of section 1331 if the action is governed by federal common law.”).
201 City of Huntsville v. City of Madison, 24 F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Nat’l
Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 850 (1985)); see also Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (“[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon
federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”).
202 See supra Section III.A.
203 See text accompanying notes 147-49.
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negotiate without the EEOC’s assistance are able to enforce their rights in
federal court.204
Applying federal common law would also inhibit defendants’ abilities to
forum shop.205 When a defendant is sued in federal court, settling and then
breaching creates a means to confine the dispute to state court and defeat
the plaintiff ’s choice of forum. In essence, the defendant conducts a two-step
“reverse removal.”206 This tactic allows the employers to delay compensation,
exploit favorable state defenses to settlements, and perhaps most importantly
in the case of state defendants, assert sovereign immunity.207
Curing these problems would provide federal courts with the necessary
tools to begin combating the problems fostered by the current push to settle.
And a greater volume of meritorious claims would put the scope of current
problems in the administration of Title VII into perspective. Moreover, it
would ensure access to the federal forum, as Congress originally intended.
In general, airing more settlement-enforcement cases in federal courts could
begin to shift the public’s view to a more accurate perception of the realities
of employment discrimination and would facilitate the courts’ ability to
handle new developments in employment discrimination.208
204 Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (“In some ways, of course, a congressional
power to authorize private suits against nonconsenting States in their own courts would be even
more offensive to state sovereignty than a power to authorize the suits in a federal forum.”).
205 Of course, it is possible that the employee would prefer state court and federal common
law would therefore provide an unwanted mechanism for the defendant to remove the case to
federal court. However, if the employee desired to avoid federal court, she could initially bring
suit under a state analogue to Title VII rather than under the federal statute, if the state law
provided adequate coverage. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
LAWS ON EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISCRIMINATION, available at www.ncsl.org/documents/
employ/DiscriminationChart-III.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (compiling a list of employment
discrimination statutes in all fifty states and the District of Columbia). A settlement of a state law
claim would certainly fall under state law. See, e.g., Fernandez v. City of New York, No. 12-1591,
2012 WL 5458029, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2012); Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12
F.3d 1205, 1209 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993).
206 First, the defendant settles the claim; second, the defendant breaches the settlement and
thereby forces the employee (assuming no independent ground for federal court jurisdiction
exists) to sue to enforce the settlement in state court.
The term “reverse removal” is taken from the abstention context. It is used there to describe
states’ ability to deprive a litigant of a federal forum by winning the race to the courthouse and
instituting an enforcement action before the litigant can sue for prospective relief. See Joshua G.
Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 11 n.70 (2011).
207 Applying federal law would also be consistent with any requirement that employees file a
charge with the EEOC and go through the conciliation process before suing to enforce a
settlement. While the argument was made above that exhaustion should not be required, it would
at least be more satisfying if going through the steps gave the employee the right to get into
federal court.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. An obvious response to this proposal is that
federal courts are busy enough as it is: if anything is to be added to their docket, it should not be
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C. Impact on States’ Ability to Assert Sovereign Immunity
It is less likely that the development of federal common law principles
would remedy the harm that accrues when the state breaches a settlement
and then asserts sovereign immunity as a defense. As explained above, when
enforcement suits are judged as arising under state contract law, the Eleventh Amendment prevents state employees from bringing their claims in
federal court (should diversity or supplemental jurisdiction exist), and claims
brought in state court are dependent on the specifics of that state’s sovereign immunity doctrine.209 This Section urges that a different result should
attach if federal common law is applied, but fully recognizes that the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence over the past two decades strongly suggests
that state sovereign immunity will remain an obstacle in this area.210
The Eleventh Amendment’s roots spring from concern about suits to
compel states to pay debts. Chisolm v. Georgia allowed an action of assumpsit
by an individual citizen to proceed against the state of Georgia,211 and the
Eleventh Amendment is designed, if for nothing else, to prohibit persons
from recovering debts in a similar manner (at least, all commentators would
agree, in diversity actions). As Justice Stevens explained in one of his many
dissents attempting to limit the reach of the Eleventh Amendment, “Chief
Justice Marshall understood the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to have been
designed primarily to protect States from being sued for their debts.”212
Accordingly, the Court’s predilection for recognizing sovereign immunity is

more frivolous Title VII cases. However, that reaction overlooks the systemic change that would
be possible with more federal enforcement of settlements. Bringing these cases to federal court
likely means bringing more meritorious cases to federal court as the employer that settles may well
have felt the charges against it were not entirely frivolous. And, once these more meritorious cases
begin to create a record to which future plaintiffs can refer, second generation cases might be
brought with more ease. See supra notes 33-35. Thus, while the absolute number of cases may
increase, the percentage of those cases that are frivolous will theoretically decline.
209 See supra Section III.B.
210 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002) (holding
that states possess sovereign immunity from suit in a federal agency); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign
immunity to suit in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that
Congress cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit in federal
court).
211 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 428 (1793).
212 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 90 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821)); see also, e.g., Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the
Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 213, 228 (2006) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as having “sought to prevent suits
against states based on broken executory contracts (most particularly, state defaults on its
bonds)”).
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exacerbated here because, whether it arises under state or federal law, a
settlement of a Title VII claim is, in essence, a contract to pay a sum of
money.213 Indeed, the foundation of the Court’s current Eleventh Amendment doctrine, Hans v. Louisiana, rejected a suit “to recover the amount of
certain coupons annexed to bonds of the State.”214 In Hans, a citizen of
Louisiana attempted to sue directly under the Constitution’s Contract
Clause, and the Court’s decision that the Eleventh Amendment precluded
the action215 necessarily went beyond the text of the Amendment, which only
explicitly prohibits suits by “Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”216 This extension of the Amendment’s text
reflects that “efforts to enforce contracts against [states] have historically
been regarded as especially sensitive and problematic.”217 Therefore, any
arguments in favor of finding a lack of immunity in contract actions should
be cognizant of the uphill battle they face.218
If enforcement of a Title VII settlement is to be free from the Eleventh
Amendment’s constraints, it must first be distinguishable from Hans. The
alleged cause of action in Hans also arose under federal common law, albeit
directly under the Constitution.219 Even Justice Stevens has therefore conceded
that Hans “reflects, at the most, this Court’s conclusion that, as a matter of
federal common law, federal courts should decline to entertain suits against
unconsenting States.”220
Nonetheless, the circumstances in Hans and Title VII settlementenforcement suits are distinguishable. Hans concerned a contract in the first
instance, when the state presumably had always retained immunity; however,
213 Cf. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (describing “suits for money
damages against the State” as “the heart of the Eleventh Amendment's concern”). While some
Title VII settlements do include promises to take prospective action to remedy discrimination,
this subsection focuses on what the Court has termed “retrospective relief.” See, e.g., Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
214 134 U.S. 1, 1 (1890).
215 Id. at 1, 3.
216 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Although the text of the Amendment does not distinguish
between types of suits, many argue that the Amendment does not apply to federal question suits,
regardless of whether they are brought by citizens or noncitizens. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Eleventh
Amendment has no relevance” to federal question jurisdiction).
217 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 881 (6th ed. 2009).
218 Moreover, opponents of the creation of federal common law normally bristle at the
alleged violation of separation of powers that common law facilitates. Such opponents would
surely cry foul at the development of a rule that stifled sovereign immunity, which they would
contend infringes on federalism concerns as well.
219 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
220 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 84 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Title VII settlements involve contracts that release states from situations in
which they lack immunity. Thus, the cause of action in Hans was independent of any federal statute, but the cause of action in a settlementenforcement suit may be considered an outgrowth of Title VII.221
In addition, although it would go too far to suggest that different rules
should apply to different types of debts, it should not be ignored that the
underlying bonds at issue in Hans are of a different kind than the underlying potential liability in a Title VII case. As Justice Souter has argued, the
decision in Hans may reflect the Court’s maneuvering around the prospect
that heavily indebted states in the postbellum era would simply ignore court
orders to make good on their contracts.222 The risk of a state going bankrupt
because of violations of Title VII is, one hopes, nonexistent.
Even if one accepts that Hans does not directly control, it still must be
established that the Eleventh Amendment would not otherwise apply.
Generally, sovereign immunity precludes a suit for retrospective relief unless
Congress validly and clearly abrogates the state’s immunity or the state
consents to suit.223 The former seems inapposite to settlement-enforcement
suits. Although Congress clearly abrogated sovereign immunity for Title
VII actions,224 the enforcement suit would be composed of judicially crafted
federal common law, which would not satisfy the Court’s congressional
abrogation requirement.
As to state waiver, however, courts could develop a rule of federal common law to read consent into settlements of Title VII suits. There is modest
support for this notion in the spirit, if not the precise holding, of the
Court’s decision in Lapides v. Board of Regents.225 In Lapides, a state statute
waived sovereign immunity in state court, so the state-defendant voluntarily
221 This is not meant to suggest that a contract claim governed by federal law would constitute an implied cause of action. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (calling into
question whether an implied cause of action, which is difficult enough to establish in the first
place, could ever satisfy the Court’s clear statement rule for abrogation).
222 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 122-23 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting). The reaction to Chisolm
sprung from a similar fear of having to make good on debts from the Revolutionary War. See Hess v.
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment
was adopted in part as a response to states’ fears that federal courts would require them to pay
their Revolutionary War debts).
223 See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (“A State may
waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it
by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain
a private person’s suit against a State.” (citations and footnote omitted)).
224 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n.2 (1976) (describing how Congress specifically amended Title VII to include employees of “a State government, government agency or
political subdivision”).
225 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
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removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds.226 The Supreme Court rejected the immunity defense
and found that the act of removal had voluntarily and clearly waived it.227
Before concluding, the Court cabined the reach of its holding to removal to
federal court “of state-law claims, with respect to which the State has explicitly
waived immunity from state-court proceedings.”228
Despite this limitation, the principles underlying the decision in Lapides
provide support for finding, as a principle of federal common law, consent
to enforcement suits in federal court in Title VII settlements. The Court
found that allowing a sovereign immunity defense in Lapides “would permit
States to achieve unfair tactical advantages.”229 When a state breaches a
Title VII settlement and follows up with a sovereign immunity defense, it
attempts to exploit a comparable tactical advantage. That the state uses a
more cumbersome process to bring about its sovereign immunity defense
than did the Lapides defendant should not change the result. The decision to
delay litigation and force the plaintiff to bring two suits should not be
rewarded with acceptance of a sovereign immunity defense. Reading
consent into settlements avoids this unfair result.230
While a state’s consent to suit normally requires an unequivocal clear
statement,231 Lapides relaxed that standard for “litigation conduct.”232 Lapides
distinguished between “constructive waivers” in federal legislation and
“litigation conduct,” such as removal to federal court.233 The latter, the
Court explained, need not be expressed in specific terms to be clear.234 The

226
227
228
229
230

Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 621.
Fairness concerns are not unique to Lapides. In Reich v. Collins, the Court held that states
could not prevent residents from challenging allegedly unlawful state taxes before collection and
then assert sovereign immunity when the residents invoked a post-deprivation remedy after
collection. 513 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1994). To withdraw the promised remedy by asserting an Eleventh
Amendment defense, the Court explained, would be to pull an unfair “bait and switch.” Id. at 111;
see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (characterizing the holding in Reich as stemming
from due process concerns because the state withdrew a proffered “clear and certain” remedy upon
which citizens relied); cf. generally John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1121
(1993) (discussing the role of “justice” in sovereign immunity doctrine).
231 See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011) (holding that consent to
“appropriate relief” was not clear enough to constitute consent to damages actions).
232 Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620.
233 Id. (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 681 n.3 (1999)).
234 See id. (“The relevant ‘clarity’ here must focus on the litigation act the State takes that
creates the waiver. And that act—removal—is clear.”).
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difference stemmed from what the Court termed as the “judicial need to
avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness.”235
Although the Court limited its holding to removed state law claims for
which immunity in state court was waived, the “inconsistency, anomaly, and
unfairness” is heightened in the Title VII–settlement context. In the state-law
context, the initial waiver can be viewed as the grace of the state and the
revocation as a mere withdrawal of the benefit. However, in the Title VII
context, the initial waiver is involuntary; the state lacks a right to withdraw
the waiver even before suit is filed.236 Therefore, the settle-then-breach
litigation tactic allows the state to do what it cannot do directly—assert
sovereign immunity—and, as litigation conduct, should be subjected to a
lower standard of consent.
The creation of federal common law could protect employees from such
an underhanded result by finding consent to suit in federal court in each
settlement. Moreover, such a rule would provide proper incentives for
state-defendants and would relieve employee-plaintiffs of a disincentive for
taking an otherwise favorable settlement. For these reasons, federal common
law would better serve the goals of Title VII. Undoubtedly, this rule would
require an extension of current law,237 but it is warranted.238

235
236

Id.
Indeed, this distinction provides a limiting principle that avoids the seemingly logical
extension of this proposed rule to all settlement agreements. In the large majority of breached
settlements, the state-defendant initially voluntarily consented to suit, making the settle-thenbreach tactic, while still abrasive, somewhat more palatable.
237 Lapides has not been used outside of the removal context, and it has been construed narrowly even there. See, e.g., Watters v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 295 F.3d 36, 42 n.13 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (declining to apply “the narrow holding of Lapides” when the District of Columbia had
not waived immunity in its own courts before removing to federal court). Moreover, the Courts of
Appeals have required a clear expression of consent in settlement agreement terms outside of the
Title VII context. See, e.g., Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]hat the defendants here entered into a settlement agreement . . . does not act as a waiver of
the defendants’ constitutionally protected immunity because the settlement agreement does not
itself indicate, nor does the record otherwise reflect, an unequivocal intent to waive the immunity
by the agreement.”); Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The State’s consent . . .
must be unequivocally expressed.”), abrogated by Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 438
(2004).
238 Finally, federal common law would allow access to the full remedy that Title VII creates.
Congress vested state employees who are victims of employment discrimination with a right to
seek redress against the state in a federal forum. Of course, the employee can choose to forego the
federal forum and initiate litigation in state court (and it is unlikely—though, as Lapides illustrates,
not impossible—that the state would remove to federal courts in such a situation), but the state
should not be able to use the settle-then-breach tactic to make that decision for the employee.
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D. Can Federal Law Be Used?
Simply declaring that federal law would clear up the confusion, remedy
procedural hurdles, and address the systemic problems caused by settlements does not mean that courts have the authority to create federal law. As
argued above, the courts that have addressed the propriety of applying federal
law have done so inadequately. In reality, much of the case law and commentary support the application of state law.239 Nevertheless, this Section
argues that a shift to federal law in Title VII settlement-enforcement cases is
warranted.
1. Rules of Decision Act
The Rules of Decision Act240 states, “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.”241 The question thus becomes whether Title VII “otherwise require[s]
or provide[s]” application of federal law to settlement-enforcement suits.
The Supreme Court’s case law in analogous areas suggests that it does.
It is generally accepted that courts properly use federal law to fill the
“interstices” of federal statutes.242 Along these lines, courts have readily
developed federal law in certain areas of Title VII, such as determining the
meaning of individual statutory terms243 and the viability of a claim after
ownership of the employing company has changed hands.244 However, as
the discussion above245 demonstrates, courts have been hesitant to dismiss
the argument that the Rules of Decision Act requires that state law be used
in Title VII settlement-enforcement suits.
239
240
241
242

See infra note 280.
The analysis in this subsection is heavily borrowed from O’Gorman, supra note 9, at 126-27.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
See Nelson, supra note 61, at 503; see also DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 160 n.13 (1983) (“[N]o decision of this Court has held or suggested that the [Rules of Decision]
Act requires borrowing state law to fill gaps in federal substantive statutes.”).
243 See, e.g., Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 1999) (declaring that the
question of whether an employer has fewer than fifteen employees within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) is “one of federal common law”).
244 See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2004)
(applying federal, not state, law to determine the scope of corporate successor liability with respect
to Title VII claims); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (6th
Cir. 1974) (same). But see Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94-95
(1981) (holding that a right of contribution for defendants to Title VII claims should not be
created in the absence of Congressional action).
245 See supra subsection II.B.2.
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Nevertheless, Supreme Court precedent suggests that federal law applies
to waiver of federal claims despite the Rules of Decision Act.246 In Town of
Newton v. Rumery, the Court addressed a waiver of a § 1983 claim and
declared that the enforceability of the waiver constituted a question of
federal law.247 While Rumery could potentially be distinguished as involving
the preliminary public policy question of the enforceability of a waiver in
any instance, which necessarily requires considerations of federal policy, the
Court has elsewhere held that federal common law applies to all aspects of a
waiver of a federal claim. In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.,
the Court held that federal law would govern the defenses available in
challenging the enforcement of a waiver of a claim under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act because application of state rules could undermine
the federal statute’s aims.248 Some lower courts have reached the same result
in Title VII settlement cases.249 Accordingly, the Rules of Decision Act
likely does not decide the issue.250
2. Creation of Federal Law Versus Absorption of State Law
Even if the Rules of Decision Act does not control the issue and courts
have the power to create federal common law, they need not exercise their
discretion to do so.251 The Supreme Court has, at times, decided that the

246 For a contrary conclusion, see Nelson, supra note 61, at 552-54, who argues that a traditional conflict-of-laws analysis calls for the application of state law.
247 See 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (stating that resolution of the validity of the waiver requires
“reference to traditional common-law principles”).
248 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952); see also O’Gorman, supra note 9, at 126-27 (arguing that the
Rules of Decision Act does not mandate that state law govern the enforcement of Title VII
settlements).
249 See, e.g., Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that federal
law governs Title VII waivers).
250 Even if cases like Rumery and Dice mean that federal law controls when a settlement is
raised as a defense to a new Title VII suit, it can be argued that state law still controls when the
employee seeks to enforce the contract. It would be strange to condition the application of federal
law on the identity of the plaintiff. Cf. Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.
2000) (stating that it would “defy common sense” for the same issue to turn on federal law when
the federal government was party to a case, but on state law when the federal government was not
joined); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 848 (1989) (asserting
that it would be “counterintuitive” to apply stricter standards when developing federal common
law for affirmative claims than when developing it for defenses).
251 In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court, considering the potential
application of federal common law to the Investment Company Act (ICA), stated, “It is clear that
the contours of the . . . ICA are governed by federal law . . . It does not follow, however, that the
content of . . . a rule must be wholly the product of a federal court’s own devising.” 500 U.S.
90, 97-98 (1991); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979)
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use of federal rules is appropriate to govern settlements of federal statutory
claims.252 However, the Court has more recently expressed reluctance
toward blanket applications of federal common law and has instead required
absorption of state law in most circumstances.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. laid out three factors to consider when
determining whether development of federal common law is justified.
Courts must assess (1) the need for a uniform body of law, (2) whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal
statute, and (3) the extent to which applying a federal rule would disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law.253 In O’Melveny & Meyers
v. FDIC, the Court emphasized the latter two factors.254 It stated that
“significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law” is a “precondition for recognition of a federal rule of decision.”255
The Court also derided the need for uniformity as the “most generic (and
lightly invoked)” federal interest.256
a. The Uniformity Interest
Despite the Supreme Court’s treatment of uniformity in O’Melveny &
Meyers, it remains a factor that courts consider and is presumably more
persuasive when not merely “lightly invoked.” The aims and importance of
Title VII counsel in favor of uniformity. In providing employees a right to
sue for employment discrimination, Title VII helps ensure that similarly
situated persons are treated in a consistent manner. At least some justices
have recognized, albeit in a different context, the “need for uniform interpretation” to avoid “the unfairness of treating similar employees differently.”257
That concern is surely heightened when discrimination is at issue, as
shown in Congress’s decision to invoke its Section Five power and abrogate
state sovereign immunity via Title VII.258 Congress’s abrogation of state
sovereign immunity demonstrates its intent to make state interests secondary to federal interests with respect to securing the aims of Title VII. While
(“Controversies directly affecting the operations of federal programs, although governed by
federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.”).
252 See Dice, 342 U.S. at 361; see also O’Gorman, supra note 9, at 118-24.
253 440 U.S. at 728-29.
254 512 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1994).
255 Id. at 87 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
256 Id. at 88.
257 Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 709 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
258 It would be similarly unfair to apply one set of rules when an employee sues a state
employer and another set of rules for all other employer-defendants.
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Title VII’s application to private employers is grounded in Congress’s power
under Article I, an employee’s ability to enforce a settlement against an
employer still should not depend on the state in which the employee
worked. The federalism interests that normally counsel against displacement
of state law are slighter in this context—a uniform rule is more appropriate.259
b. The Conflict Between State Law and a Uniquely Federal Interest
The second Kimbell Foods factor examines whether application of state
law would significantly conflict with a uniquely federal policy or interest.260
This prong is best treated in two steps: first, considering the existence of a
uniquely federal interest, and second, determining the presence of a significant conflict between the application of state law and the federal interest.
i. The Uniquely Federal Interest
Consideration of Title VII’s substantive goals reveals the presence of a
uniquely federal interest. It is important to remember for whom Congress
created Title VII; as the Supreme Court has noted, Title VII “concerns not
majoritarian processes, but an individual’s right to equal employment
opportunities.”261 While it is true that employees may bring “reverse
discrimination claims,”262 members of protected classes initiate most Title
VII claims. Congress’s use of its Section Five power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity underscores the importance of the federal interest. The
rules governing contract disputes arising out of settlement breaches should
therefore take into account this uniquely federal interest.263
259 In O’Melveny & Myers, the Supreme Court rejected the FDIC’s contention that uniformity
was necessary because it would ease the strain on resources the FDIC endured while researching
each state’s laws. See 512 U.S. at 88 (“[I]f the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified
as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’ rules.”). By contrast,
the call for uniformity here stems from a concern that an employee’s ability to vindicate her Title
VII rights may be impeded because of where she works; it is not motivated by a concern that
employees or employers are operating in multiple states and will be better able to handle litigation
if only one set of rules applies.
260 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (describing the need to
consider whether applying state law would frustrate federal objectives); see also Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (stating that a uniquely federal interest is necessary,
though not sufficient, for displacing state law).
261 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
262 A reverse discrimination claim occurs when a member of a majority group claims discrimination in favor of a minority group. See, e.g., Plantan v. Harry S. Truman Coll., No. 10-108,
2011 WL 5122691, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011).
263 See Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. Sears Realty Co., 932 F. Supp. 392, 399 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(declaring that development of federal common law is appropriate when “necessary to protect
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Undoubtedly, opponents of the development of federal common law
will point out that the Supreme Court has rarely held,264 in the absence of a
special jurisdictional provision,265 that federal common law may be created
to govern proceedings in which the federal government’s fiscal interests are
not implicated. Yet, the Court has developed federal common law in suits
in which the federal government was not a party.266 Moreover, lower courts
have developed federal law to govern settlements of federal securities law
claims for suits between private parties in which the federal government
lacks a fiscal interest.267
More importantly, Title VII responded to pervasive employment discrimination that state law failed to remedy.268 Congress’s use of its Section
Five power to complete the Title VII antidote highlights the importance of
the scheme as a federal interest. The lack of a fiscal interest that matches
uniquely federal interests” (emphasis added) (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 640 (1981))); cf. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 72 (stating that the creation of federal
common law may be appropriate when state law would “frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs”). Most findings of “uniquely federal interests” deal with “the rights and obligations of
the United States.” See United States v. Crown Equip. Corp., 86 F.3d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1996)
(collecting cases).
264 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (applying
federal law to settlements of Federal Employers’ Liability Act claims because “the federal rights
affording relief to injured railroad employees under a federally declared standard could be
defeated if states were permitted to have the final say as to what defenses could and could not be
properly interposed”).
265 In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, the Court held that federal law governed suits for breaches of contracts arising out of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).
353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). Section 301 of the LMRA creates jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). In
contrast, Title VII’s special jurisdiction provision creates federal court jurisdiction in a more
general manner, without reference to contracts between employees and employers. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3). Thus, the Court has interpreted the provision to supply no more additional
jurisdiction than § 1331 would provide on its own. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506
(2006) (noting that § 2000e-5(f)(3) serves to underscore Congress’s intention to provide a federal
forum under the full scope of § 1331). But see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due
Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2059-60 (2008) (arguing
that specialized jurisdictional provisions such as § 2000e-5(f)(3) should be interpreted to confer
jurisdiction in a manner that enables “the full and comprehensive vindication of the statutory
scheme of which they were a part”).
266 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (creating a special defense to
state law tort claims against military contractors when such liability conflicts with federal policy).
267 See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 486 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1995) (creating a federal
rule of decision for settlement contribution); cf. In re Consol. Freightways Corp., 443 F.3d 1160,
1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering the argument that the federal government’s interest in regulating
interstate transportation could be a uniquely federal interest but not finding sufficient conflict to
justify the use of federal common law).
268 Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee Thresholds in
Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1075 (2006).
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the Court’s previous decisions should not be considered sufficient to bar
courts from developing federal rules of decision. The eradication of discrimination should not be excluded from the category of uniquely important
federal interests.
ii. The Existence of a Significant Conflict
The majority of this Comment has attempted to demonstrate the scope
of the conflict between the current state of affairs and the aims of Title VII.
The aggressive push to settle, the effects of confidential settlement, the
untailored substantive law, and the procedural difficulties make it unnecessarily challenging for employees to vindicate their Title VII rights. It is true
that no single aspect of state law generates the requisite “significant conflict”
the Court requires. However, the overall use of state law clearly undermines federal efforts to accomplish the goals of Title VII.
With respect to procedural issues, use of state law (a) creates inconsistent rules as to whether a state is a viable defendant in an enforcement
suit; and (b) renders an employee’s ability to enforce a suit in federal court
dependent on (1) the jurisdiction in which the employee works, (2) whether
her claim falls under federal courts’ supplemental or diversity jurisdiction,
and (3) the EEOC’s level of involvement. These factors, in combination,
limit the power of federal courts to monitor settlements and to ensure that a
policy of encouraging settlements as a means of voluntary compliance does
not overshadow the twin aims of Title VII—deterring employment discrimination and compensating its victims. Application of federal rules would
mitigate these conflicts.
The development of federal rules would also allow courts to remedy
clashes between state substantive law and federal interests. In United States
v. Northrop Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that federal common law applied
to the waiver of a claim under the False Claims Act.269 The court reasoned
that applying state law to such waivers would risk undermining the purposes
of the False Claims Act and instead “favor[]ironclad and enforceable general
releases.”270 The “voluntary and knowing” standard, as well as any rule
developed to address the validity of oral settlements, combats this same
problem. Furthermore, in Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the application of state law would undermine the federal
government’s “ability to safeguard its interests in commercial dealings”
because the federal agency at issue “carefully select[ed] loan recipients”
269
270

59 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. (citation omitted).
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“with detailed knowledge” and “tailor[ed] each transaction with state law in
mind.”271 An employee who is discriminated against clearly does not choose
to be discriminated against with any degree of consent, let alone “carefully”
and with “detailed knowledge.” Thus, she is unable to tailor the instances in
which resorting to contractual settlements will be necessary and may not be
readily able to “safeguard” her interests. The substance of federal common
law could protect against this inability to anticipate workplace discrimination.
Application of federal common law would suppress the risk of conflicting
state laws in other ways as well. It would allow courts specifically to enforce
settlements that require employers to take actions other than providing
monetary compensation—as Title VII settlements often do272—because state
courts are often unreceptive to specific performance clauses.273 Finally, use
of federal common law rules would help combat the perception that Title
VII claims are often meritless and help federal courts develop a better
understanding of “second generation discrimination.”274
c. The Effect on Commercial Relationships
The third Kimbell Foods factor considers the degree to which application
of federal common law would “disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law.”275 Settlement of a Title VII claim, however, likely fails to
qualify as a “commercial relationship,” and thus the third Kimbell Foods
factor should not cause much concern.276
Even if these settlements are deemed commercial, this aspect of Kimbell
Foods should not preclude the creation of federal common law. The Supreme
Court instructs that the presumption that state law should be absorbed as
federal law is “particularly strong” in areas where private parties transact
271
272

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 735-36 (1979).
See, e.g., Greene v. Rumsfeld, 266 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (D.D.C. 2003) (exemplifying how
settlement terms may require an employer to promote an employee).
273 See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“[S]tate courts might be hostile to certain terms typically included in these agreements, such as
specific performance clauses.”); Owens v. West, 182 F. Supp. 2d 180, 189 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Some
state courts, for example, might be wary of enforcing . . . specific performance clauses.”).
274 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. Professor Kotkin argues that federal courts
could create rules to counter the effects of confidential settlements, mainly suggesting that
settlements be made dependent on court approval and remain open to the public. See Kotkin, supra
note 21, at 971-72 (citing D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 115-16 (1946)). While her
recommendation would be addressed in an original suit, enforcement suits could develop a similar
rule when the allegedly breached settlement contains a confidentiality clause.
275 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
276 See O’Gorman, supra note 9, at 146 (arguing that settlements of Title VII claims are analogous to settlements of personal injury claims and are, therefore, not commercial transactions).
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with the expectation that state law will govern.277 While parties may
normally assume that state law governs contracts,278 settlements of Title VII
claims operate in an area of less-than-normal clarity.279 Moreover, settlements are meant to further voluntary compliance, and thus the rules
governing settlements should not be tailored to those who consistently
settle rather than prospectively comply. Doing so would put undue emphasis
on the means of enforcing Title VII to the detriment of the aims of Title VII.
*

*

*

In sum, application of federal common law to Title VII settlementenforcement suits is warranted, 280 even if the current trends in the case law
cut in the opposite direction, rendering this proposal unlikely to gain traction.
These settlements implicate a uniquely federal interest that federal rules
would further and that application of state law undermines.
CONCLUSION
Congress’s encouragement of settlements has engendered significant
negative consequences. Too often, the focus has been on facilitating settlements when the primary goal should be preventing and compensating
workplace discrimination. The volume of suits in which the validity of
settlements arising from Title VII complaints is at issue strongly suggests
that private settlement, as presently conducted, is an insufficient remedy.
These complications, coupled with the negative consequences that settlements—and especially confidential settlements—may have, suggest that
passive application of state law to enforcement suits produces a settlement
regime in significant conflict with Title VII’s aims. Though settlement will
unavoidably play some role in combating employment discrimination, the
current uninhibited push to resolve claims out of court puts too great a
277
278
279

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).
E.g., VKK Corp. v. NFL, 244 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2001).
See supra Section II.D; see also, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Borst, No. 03-0274, 2006 WL
1308118, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2006); Cornell v. Delco Elecs. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120
(S.D. Ind. 2000).
280 Other commentators have come to contrary conclusions. See Calleros, supra note 137, at
297-306 (finding a lack of a sufficiently significant conflict or strong federal interest to justify
creation of federal common law for suits enforcing EEOC conciliation agreements); O’Gorman,
supra note 9, at 129-47 (applying the Kimbell Foods factors and concluding that the creation of
federal common law is generally inappropriate but may at times require respect of certain state
contract rules); Michael E. Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretation of Settlements of Federal Civil
Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 295, 329 (1988) (rejecting the need for application of federal
common law to civil rights settlements).
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strain on, and risks undermining, Title VII’s deterrent and compensatory
goals. The development of federal common law would help address this
problem and better effectuate the purpose of Title VII.

